Page 35 - Texas police Association Peace Officer Guide 2017

On February 28, 2012, Vasquez filed this lawsuit against the Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
arguing that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him and searching his car
without reasonable suspicion.

The district court granted the Officers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. It held that Vasquez failed to show that the Officers’ conduct violated clearly
established law, and as such, he could not overcome their immunity from suit. Vasquez timely
appealed.

An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop, and the scope must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.
Absent the detainee’s valid consent, the scope or duration of an investigative detention may be
expanded beyond its initial purpose only if the detaining officer, at the time of the detention, has
“a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” the circumstances. Officers may rely on common sense and ordinary human
experience, and we avoid second-guessing a law enforcement officer’s judgment.

This Court has repeatedly admonished law enforcement that once an officer has been assured
that a temporary tag is valid, he “should ... explain[ ] to Defendant the reason for the initial stop
and then allow[ ] her to continue on her way without requiring her to produce her license and
registration.” (the discovery of facts resolving the initial purpose of a stop “wholly dispel [s] ...
reasonable suspicion”)

We now turn to whether the Officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the search of Vasquez’s
car. They argue the following factors created reasonable suspicion: (1) Vasquez was driving
alone late at night; (2) he was travelling on I-70, “a known drug corridor”; (3) he was from
Colorado and was driving from Aurora, Colorado, “a drug source area”; (4) the back seat did not
contain items the Officers expected to see in the car of someone moving across the country; (5)
the items in his back seat were covered and obscured from view; (6) he had a blanket and pillow
in his car; (7) he was driving an older car, despite having insurance for a newer one; (8) there
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were fresh fingerprints on his trunk; and (9) he seemed nervous. Such conduct, taken together, is
hardly suspicious, nor is it particularly unusual.

Though we analyze these facts under the totality of the circumstances, we first note which
factors have less weight in our analysis. We start with the most troubling justification: Vasquez’s
status as a resident of Colorado. The Officers rely heavily on Vasquez’s residency because
Colorado is “known to be home to medical marijuana dispensaries.” But we find this
justification, in isolation or in tandem with other considerations, unconvincing. As we have said
previously, “that the defendant[ ] [was] traveling from a drug source city—or ... a drug source
state—does little to add to the overall calculus of suspicion.” Such a factor is “so broad as to be
indicative of almost nothing.” Moreover, our fellow circuits have concluded the state of
residence of a detained motorist is an “extremely weak factor, at best” in the reasonable

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 30 2017 Edition