Page 28 - TPA Journal January February 2024
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Throughout his exchange with law enforcement, tects individuals against warrantless searches and
Alkheqani spoke English well and understood the offi- seizures.” “It ‘applies to seizures of the person, includ-
cers, even going so far as to ask questions about the ing brief investigatory stops such as the stop of the
contents of the consent form. He also acknowledged vehicle here.’” “When a vehicle is stopped, the officer
that “it’s not my first,” which is consistent with his five ‘must have a particularized and objective basis for sus-
prior convictions (four of which were for felony pecting the particular person stopped of criminal activ-
Burglary of a Habitation). Officers asked him if he had ity.’” “‘[R]easonable suspicion[’] exists ‘when the
any firearms in the house, and he replied, “I have a .22 officer can point to specific and articulable facts
rifle in the back room. It’s my wife’s, she uses it. Just which, taken together with rational inferences from
for safety.” During the search of the home, the .22 cal- those facts, reasonably warrant the search and
iber rifle was found in the master bedroom. seizure.’” “[T]he level of suspicion the standard
requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing
Alkheqani was indicted for one count of possession of
by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less
a firearm by a convicted felon. He later moved to sup- than is necessary for probable cause.” “[T]he essence
press the evidence acquired from the search of his res- of all that has been written is that the totality of the cir-
idence and truck. Alkheqani argued that (1) officers cumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into
lacked reasonable suspicion to pull over his car, so the account.” “Whether an officer has reasonable suspi-
stop was unlawful, and (2) he did not voluntarily con-
cion to stop is answered from the facts known to the
sent to the search of his home and truck. The district officer at the time.” “Relevant facts and considerations
court denied the motion, finding reasonable suspicion may include a description of a suspect, a suspect’s
and voluntary consent. On March 22, 2021, the matter location and proximity to known or reported criminal
proceeded to trial by jury. Three days later, Alkheqani activity, the timeliness of information or the stop, a
was convicted.
suspect’s behavior, and the officer’s experience.”
“Facts that appear innocent when viewed in isolation
(sentencing discussion omitted.)
can constitute reasonable suspicion when viewed col-
Alkheqani now raises five issues on appeal, two of lectively.”
which involve the district court’s denial of his motion
Alkheqani argues that the district court erred in finding
to suppress. First, he argues that the police lacked a
reasonable suspicion on three main grounds. First,
particularized and objective basis for suspecting he
Alkheqani contends that the officers were operating on
committed the shooting when they initiated the traffic
generic information about the suspect and his vehicle
stop. Second, Alkheqani urges that he did not voluntar-
rather than the requisite particularized facts. Second,
ily consent to the search of his vehicle.
Alkheqani maintains that the police improperly used
“When a challenge to the denial of a motion to sup- conflicting and contradictory information to support
press is made, we review legal determinations de novo the stop. And third, Alkheqani asserts that temporal
and factual findings for clear error.” . “We view the and geographic proximity do not weigh in support of a
evidence in the light most favorable to the party who finding of reasonable suspicion because he was seized
prevailed in district court — here, the Government.” . three hours after the shooting at a distance less than a
“The district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will mile away. We disagree. In sum, we agree with the dis-
be upheld if there is any reasonable view of the evi- trict court that (1) the stop was based on particularized,
dence to support doing so.” not generic, information; (2) minor conflicts in eyewit-
ness accounts do not warrant a different finding; and
“‘Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to sup- (3) temporal and geographic proximity support a find-
port a stop is treated as a question of law.’” ing of reasonable suspicion. Thus, for the reasons pro-
“Demonstrating reasonable suspicion is the vided below, we reject each of Alkheqani’s arguments.
Government’s burden.” “The Fourth Amendment pro-
Alkheqani primarily relies on two casesin arguing that
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