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creatively in one or more forms that are suitable to their domestic settings,

even when they are not explicitly set forth in the TRIPS Agreement. However,
the domestic implementation of the flexibilities described here is jeopardized

by the pressure for better standards of patent protection, resulting from

post-TRIPS bilateral or multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the
developed nations and developing nations.

3. Complications in Implementing TRIPS Flexibilities

There are some complications in connection with the implementation
of TRIPS flexibilities in developing nations: (a) the absence of restrictions on

patentability requirements, (b) Unilateral pressure from the developed countries,

(c) TRIPS-plus obligations through the FTAs and (d) Non-patent barrier created

by the protection of pipeline production

A. The absence of restrictions on patentability requirements

The research reflects that not many developing nations have

integrated a full range of TRIPS flexibilities aforementioned into their domestic
(35)
patent laws. Further, to allow one flexibility without employing another can
limit the accessibility to drugs. For instance, without restrictions on the scope

of patentable subject matter and patentability requirements, patent oppositions
might not completely function since it would be difficult to oppose good

patents for public health. Correspondingly, if a country does not provide patent

opposition, the limited scope of patentability will be difficult to be enforced.

The research illustrates that Thailand has taken very slight advantage of

(35)
Said and Kapczynski, çAccess to Medicines: The Role of Intellectual Property Law and
Policy,é†9.

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