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              set forth by the TRIPS Agreement has led to the situation where developing

              countries giving up the market control and the regulation over the costs of
              drugs. Nonetheless, the TRIPS Agreement allows certain flexibilities for its

              members to protect public health. This paper discusses policy mechanisms to

              ensure pharmaceutical accessibility permitted under the TRIPS Agreement

              and also analyses the complications in implementing TRIPS flexibilities.

              The ultimate goal of this paper is to emphasize the significance of legal and
              policy designed to ensure the accessibility to pharmaceuticals. This paper

              suggests that it is essential for the countries in the South to maintain the rigid

              exploitation of the flexibilities granted by the TRIPS Agreement and to avoid

              implementing non-patent barrier to extend the period of patent protection.



              Keywords:


                      Patent law, TRIPS Agreement, TRIPS Flexibilities, Patent Policy

              Implementation, Pharmaceutical Patent



              1. Introduction


                      Patent laws and policies are crucial incentives for the creators of

              health innovation. They can greatly impact the number and direction of both
              brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals, creating both positive or negative

              impact resting upon how the domestic government devise and implement

              them. Importantly, patent laws and policies have implications for accessibility

              to pharmaceutical. This fact is displayed most drastically in the situation of

              the HIV pandemic across the globe. The prices set for a pharmaceutical
              compound of anti-retroviral (ARV) HIV treatment from companies owning the

              patents are over USD $10,000 per person a year, illustrating that such




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