Page 156 - วารสารกฎหมาย ศาลอุทธรณ์คดีชํานัญพิเศษ
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วารสารกฎหมาย ศาลอุทธรณ์คดีชำานัญพิเศษ



                    Whereas the shift in the understanding of the competitive relationship responds
            to the critique of several scholars towards the 1953 Asahi Newspaper Co. case and

            the subsequent interpretation of Article 2(6) of the AMA, Wakui informs that the 1993
            Social Insurance Agency Seal case has not been able to extend Article 2(6) of the AMA

            to vertical agreements. This issue being less important for the issue at stake, she also
            mentions that there are still a few scholars arguing that the scope of Article 2(6)
            of the AMA “should be expanded to include non-horizontal restrictions, which may be

            necessary to regulate hub-and-spoke cartel, in which a non-competitor acts either as
            a ringleader or as a facilitator.”  Such an explicit request may be understood against
                                           61
            the background that in the Social Insurance Agency Seal case there still is a requirement
            of a competitive relationship in essence,  or as Wakui notes, “the defendant [needs to
                                                   62
            be] somehow engaged in business relating to the relevant product.” 63



                 4. Applying the Antimonopoly Law to UBER-Like Algorithms



                    Algorithms  could  be  put  into  operation  by  a  supplier,  a  price  leader,
            an accountancy firm, retailers separately from each other, or a software operator.
            The first three operators of an algorithm reflect a classical hub and spoke, while the latter

            two operators of an algorithm exemplify the algorithmic hub and spoke elaborated
            by Ezrachi and Stucke.

                    When a hub and spoke cartel is being operated by a supplier facilitates a price
            fixing scheme among retailers,  the flow of information goes from the retailers to
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            the supplier. The supplier makes that information available to the other retailers.
            Instead of leaving this to a human being, the supplier could install an algorithm to collect

            information from the retailers, process it, and then steer the conduct of the retailers.
            To set up this kind of price fixing scheme, it is not necessary that the retailers share


                    61  Wakui (2018), p. 80.
                    62  Kameoka (2014), p. 45.
                    63  Wakui (2018), p. 80.
                    64  If it were a way to guarantee the same price among retailers, we would be dealing with retail price
            maintenance and not a hub-and-spoke cartel.



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