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ฉบับพิเศษ ประจำ�ปี 2564

of a movable, having been provided and established by a former lex loci rei sitae, once
the locus rei sitae is subsequently changed and moved abroad, is deemed to be

exclusively ruled by the subsequent lex rei sitae, excluding any causal relationship
possibly recognized by the former applicable law. In terms of this legal framework for

dealing with choice-of-law, there is a strong incentive to deliberately bring a movable
into a country whose local laws enable opposition to claims by the person who was
previously recognized as title holder by the former applicable law loci rei sitae. 28

In spite of this potential for legal-title laundering enabled by the lex loci rei sitae,

the position held by the High Court in this regard has been severely criticized by Japanese
Scholars, whether or not such a reaction is peculiar to Japan or an international general
29
tendency. To the contrary, there has never been found any opposition to the outcome of

the Supreme Court’s judgment to apply Japanese laws in disputed cases nor to
the general formulation, possibly almost always leading to application of the same laws

28 In view of the treatment based on the principle, a legal title holder may find it appropriate to physically
hold the movable object in an exclusive manner in order for the object not to be transported into another country.
For instance, a lease of movable property, as occurred in the case, might be regarded as a very risky business.
29 For instance, see YOKOMIZO, Case Note, 502 Hanrei Hyoron (2000) 234. Criticizing the High Court
judgment, he argued that such an issue of substantive law as the concern over laundering a stolen car shall not be
included in the dimension of choice-of-law. He went on to hold that the place of “existence” (art. 10 of Horei)
should be deemed to be in Japan in this case, in which the object actually existed in Japan and a considerable time
already passed after it had arrived there and that, in accordance with the Japanese substantive law, the acquisition
of ownership by B should have been acknowledged.
See also MORITA, Case Note, 1193 Jurisuto (2001) 127-28, criticizing the High Court judgment as
having confused the choice-of-law dimension with the concern of preventing laundering of stolen cars, regarded as
consideration of substantive law.
Certainly, in view of the classical theory of private international law, the strict distinction and articulation
of these two dimensions is crucial in order to conceptualize the transnational sphere composed of coexisting private-
law legal orders, autonomous to some extent from the inter-sovereign state relations. In this sense, any inclusion
of the substantive legal concern in the choice-of-law dimension should be treated with much attention. However,
concern over prevention of laundering should not be simply left to the substantive laws of each country or to
the hands of domestic legislators. The choice-of-law dimension itself, together with the substantive laws of different
countries, can and shall take a role to tackle the general problem of how to develop a legal structure of international
commerce, which clearly includes the legal-title laundering issue as well.

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