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                                                         56
               giving opportunity to all Judges to serve”  (emphasis added).  Consequently,
               neither the investor nor the State will have an impact on the individual

               composition of the panel hearing the dispute. This is clearly contrary to

               traditional investor-State arbitration where the disputing parties have
               autonomy and are free to select their own party-appointed arbitrators.   57

                          (d) Criticism of Appointment System


                        By abolishing the party autonomy on the appointment of arbitrators,

               the ICS responds to the traditional ISDS criticism of the occasional lack of
                                                                                   58
               objectivity or that parties have influence over the arbitration process.   However,
               the ICS Tribunal Members selection process inserts a significant element of

               political influence over ISDS which frustrates the objective of depoliticization

               that ISDS was designed to achieve. Over the years, criticisms have emerged as to
               the appointment of judges to international courts and tribunals. Participants in
               the 2010 Brandeis Institute for International Judges discussed the election and

               re-election procedures in international courts and tribunals and commented :

                           “Elections that take place within the UN system were

                           particularly criticized, both for the lack of transparency

                           in how judicial candidates are nominated, and for ‘horse
                           trading’ at election time. This term refers to the promises
                           and counter promises made among states to support

                           one another candidates for high-profile posts, including

                           judicial positions at the ICJ, ITLOS, ICTY, and ICTR. It was




               56. Article 8.27(7) of the CETA; Article 12(6) of the EU-Vietnam FTA; Article 9(7) of the TTIP.
               57. See for example, Article 9 of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010).
               58. See J. Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25(2) ICSID Review 2010,
                 339 - 355 (sparking a debate that party-appointed arbitrators are untrustworthy and advocating
                 the prohibition or at least rigorous police of the practice of unilateral appointments).





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