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come to their aid? Why did He have to split the sea for them and
drown Pharaoh and all his army?
The Chasam Sofer answers that it would not have been morally cor-
rect for the Jews to wage war against the Egyptians with the swords
in their hands, because Egypt hosted them. As Hashem commanded
“Do not feel aversion to the Egyptian, for you were a stranger in his
land...” That is why the Holy One, blessed be He, instructed the Jews
to walk through the split sea onto dry land, and the waters split, and
the Jews did not themselves wage war against them. And so, although
the Jews came out from Egypt armed for war, war was not an option
at all, even though it was a situation of danger to life. Since waging
war would contradict the moral principle of gratitude, one should
rather die than be kofer batovah.
Although the Egyptians harmed the Jews a lot more than they
helped them, for the little benefit and pleasure the Jews got from
them it was forbidden to wage war against them. All the more so is
one obligated to forgo money in order not to be ungrateful.
However, we can differentiate between the situations. The Egyp-
tians hosted the Jews, and although they also tortured them cruelly,
the bad they did does not erase the good. The physician, on the other
hand, only intended to do good. What he actually did was only bad.
Therefore, we cannot compare this situation to the Egyptians, to
whom we owe thanks.
Nonetheless, if the patient feels grateful despite all that happened
to him as a result of the surgeon’s actions, he would not be viewed as
a fool if he does not publicize the physician’s shame, and forgoes the
lawsuit.
1 SuMMaRy and Conclusions
A surgeon who erred and operated on a patient based on the data of
another patient is guilty in according to Heavenly Law, for he sinned.
There is no obligation of hakaras hatov to him. Nevertheless, if the
patient is good-hearted and feels grateful to the physician, he is not
considered a fool if he forgoes compensation from the physician.
102 1 Medical-HalacHic Responsa of Rav ZilbeRstein
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Halachically, we need not concern ourselves with fear of these dan- 4
gers. The author of the sefer was extra stringent in ensuring that we
don’t come upon even a one in a thousand chance of danger.
According to this view, a physician who fails to notify the patient
of the one-in-a-thousand chance of danger from the treatment is
exempt from paying for damages, because according to halachah we
do not concern ourselves with such a rare chance of danger. This is es-
pecially true in our case of the plastic surgeon, who treated a woman
in order to enhance her appearance, which is a mitzvah. The damage
that unintentionally resulted from the treatment is included in the
Rabbinic decree to exempt the physician who errs, as explained in
Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah #336).
Regarding the mentally ill husband, if the chance of his illness
recurring is one in a thousand we do not force him to divorce his
wife. However if the chances of a relapse are greater, and his wife
nonetheless agrees to live with him, then to what degree is she al-
lowed to endanger herself by living with a paranoid schizophrenic?
According to the Imrei Eish, she is permitted to place herself in up to a
16% chance of danger. This is a great chiddush. Clearly, however, if the
chance of danger is similar to that which a hunter or someone who
sails on a ship places himself, she is permitted to do so.
There is likely no exact percent of danger, but rather each case has
to be examined separately, as we will see below.
A beautiful novel interpretation was written in a legal ruling by
Rabbi Zevulun Graz, zt”l (Rabbinical Court Rulings, vol. 8, p. 222).
He writes as follows:
In the responsum of Avkas Rochel (#213) he cites a respon-
sum of the Radvaz that says that a double doubt (sefeik
sefeika) in the face of danger is prohibited. This is in light
of what the Ramban wrote (Chullin 8) that although usu-
ally a safek tumah (possible impurity) in the public domain
is tahor (ritually pure), when it comes to terumah and ko-
dashim (sanctified foods), which one must guard carefully,
even a safek tumah in the public domain is rendered tameh
Failing to inform a patient of possible risks 2 111