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1. Is it permissible to violate the prohibition of seclusion in a place he wants to save him, but he has no garment to wear except one that
of saving lives if there is no one else to travel with her? It is
possible that this prohibition is an appurtenance of forbidden
relations, and when not be put aside even for pikuach nefesh.
2. What should she do on Shabbos? Is it correct to ask another
person to travel, even though that would involve many more
Shabbos prohibitions, in order to prevent the prohibition of
yichud?
In regard to the first question, there are different opinions:
The Sefer Tzur Yaakov (#16) proves that it is permitted to seclude
oneself with a gentile woman if her husband is in the city, from the
words of the Gemara in Shabbos (127b): “Rav Yehoshua was once
walking to a Roman matron. When he reached the door of her house,
he closed the door before them.... Later he said to his disciples: When
I closed the door, of what did you suspect me? They said to him:
Perhaps there was a royal, secret, matter between you and her?”
This shows us that none of his disciples were with him. How was it
permissible for him to seclude himself with the gentile matron? We
cannot claim that there was concern about danger there, continues
the Tzur Yaakov, because it is ruled in the Rama (Yoreh De’ah #157:1)
that even for an appurtenance of forbidden relations, “one should be
killed but not transgress,” unless it is suspended because there is the
saving of “all Jews,” and even for this, the Noda Biyehudah (second
edition, Yoreh De’ah #161) questioned whether it is permissible to
violate forbidden sexual relations in order to save “all Jews.” Rather,
we are forced to conclude that her husband was with her, and then
it is permissible to seclude oneself with her. Thus according to this
opinion, the prohibition of seclusion is in the category of “yehareg v’al
ya’avor” (be killed but do not violate the law).
However, from the words of Ha’amek She’elah (Naso #120:3) it
seems that the prohibition of yichud is permitted in a case of pikuach
nefesh. (See also Responsa Meishiv Davar, Vol. 4 #17) He ponders the
words of Channah who said (Berachos 31b): I will go and seclude my-
elf [with another] in front of my husband. How was the prohibition
312 1 Medical-HalacHic Responsa of Rav ZilbeRstein
is made from sha’atnez (forbidden combination of wool and linen)?
Is he obligated to run out unclothed in order to save him, or is he
allowed to wear a garment made with sha’atnez? It is possible to say
that he is permitted to wear the forbidden garment even though put-
ting it on is not part of the rescue itself, but only the removal of a
possible impediment to the rescue. Proof for this is the fact that it is
permissible to walk outside the techum on Shabbos to save someone
from a fire and from an army (Tractate Rosh Hashanah 23b). How is
it permissible to walk outside the techum in his clothes? Is he not vi-
olating a Torah prohibition of taking his clothing outside the techum,
as explained in the Bi’ur Halacha (#404, s.v. leman de’amar)? It seems
certain that nonetheless the Sages allowed this, because otherwise
some people would be discouraged from rescuing others. Therefore,
it is also permissible to wear sha’atnez when saving a life. This is prob-
ably included in the Sages ruling regarding fish (Tractate Yoma 84b),
where they state “and one does not have to obtain permission from
the beis din.” [Perhaps one can reject this statement because a person’s
clothes are nullified to his body. This is not comparable to what we
learned in Tractate Beitzah (37b) regarding two people who borrowed
clothes and are only allowed to go as far as both of them are allowed
to walk outside the city on Shabbos, since in that case the clothes are
not nullified to the body of the person.] Nonetheless, we see that
even forbidden acts that do not directly contribute to saving a life,
but rather serve to remove impediments to the rescue, are permitted.
I heard from Rav Yechezkel Abramsky, zt”l, regarding the famous
question: How does the Torah allow us to kill a person who steals
sleathily? Shouldn’t the homeowner give him the money and spare
him from death? Isn’t this similar to the law that states that if one can
save another with one of his limbs, he is forbidden to kill him? (Trac-
tate Sanhedrin 74a) Rav Abramsky explains that the Torah knows a
person’s innermost nature. A person does not forego his money and,
as a result, a situation of pikuach nefesh to the homeowner will devel-
op once again. Therefore, he is allowed to kill his pursuer.
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