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net and raises him out… and he need not obtain permission from
beis din.” The word “permission” is strange. Beis din asserts whether an
act is permitted or forbidden. They reveal the halacha. What does it
mean to obtain the “permission” of Beis Din? According to the Ran,
we can explain that permission to enjoy the fish that came up in the
net is not a given. It is based on the words of our Sages, who saw fit to
#
uproot an injunction of the Torah so that nothing will stop a person
from saving a life, and therefore there is place to assume that one must
obtain permission from beis din each time anew. Therefore, the braisa
informs us that one always acts immediately for pikuach nefesh, and he
need not obtain permission from beis din.
Being that the Sages permitted a peripheral action in order to
encourage the rescuer and to hurry him, we can certainly rule, all
the more so, that one is permitted to bring the husband on Shabbos.
Without the husband’s presence, the surgeon is liable to hesitate
about performing the surgery out of fear of possible repercussions.
We can explain the Ran in a different way as well. If the rescuer
would be forbidden to cast his net with the intention of catching
anything other than the child, he would be liable to tarry while ex-
amining his own intentions. His fear of sin would hold him back
from saving the child immediately. Therefore, the Sages permitted a
person to save a child even when his intent in casting a net is also to
catch fish. This is similar to the explanation of the Mishnah Berurah
(#328:33) on why it is permissible for a Jew to save a life even if a
gentile is available. Were this not so, explains the Mishnah, we could
easily come to a situation where a Jew tarries while looking for a gen-
tile, thus endangering the patient.
According to this explanation, there is no proof that the Sages’
intention was to provide an incentive for the rescuer. However, there
is some proof that the Sages tried to remove every possible deterrent
from the rescuer. Therefore, it is plausible that lack of consent from
the husband is an impediment to saving his wife’s life, because the
surgeon will be unable to focus on the surgery. This requires further
study.
What happens if a person sees that someone fainted outside, and
332 1 Medical-HalacHic Responsa of Rav ZilbeRstein
of seclusion permitted? We have to say that Channah was in danger,
as we can learn from the statement of Rachel to Yaakov: “but if not
[without children] I will die,” (Bereishis 30:1) and for pikuach nefesh,
yichud is permissible. Only actual idolatry and forbidden sexual re-
lations require one to “be killed but do not transgress,” but not an
appurtenance of these two cardinal sins. Therefore, it was permissible
for her to seclude herself with a stranger in order to be saved from the
danger. Thus we see that there are opposing opinions on whether or
not the prohibition of seclusion is permitted for pikuach nefesh?
In the Sefer Shem Aryeh (Even Ha’ezer #33) there is a similar ques-
tion to ours. There was a woman who was having a difficult labor on
Shabbos, and sent for a Jewish midwife, whose wagon driver was a
gentile. They did not know whether it was correct to send a Jewish
guard to ride with the midwife, in order to prevent the prohibition of
yichud, at the cost of an added desecration of Shabbos. They conclud-
ed that a child should ride with her, which would then involve only a
Rabbinic prohibition. The Shem Aryeh was later asked whether they
had ruled according to halacha.
He answered that it is probably preferable that a Jew travel with
her, because Shabbos is suspended for pikuach nefesh, which is not so
for yichud which is an appurtenance of forbidden sexual relations
for which one must be killed, rather than violating the prohibition.
The Nimukei Yosef (Sanhedrin 17b, in the pages of the Rif) proves this
from the Gemara (ibid, 75a) which relates that a man once set eyes
on a woman forbidden to him, and fell dangerously ill as a result. The
physicians said the only way to cure him was to allow him to have
relations with her. The Sages said: Better he dies but not have forbid-
den relations with her. Let him talk to her from behind a partition,
the physcians responded. Let him die rather than converse with her,
ruled the Sages. We see from here that even for an appurtenance of
forbidden relations, we rule “be killed but do not violate the prohibi-
tion.” So, too, rules the Rama (Yoreh De’ah #157:1).
However, the Mishneh Lamelech (Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 17:7) cites the
fact that some poskim disagree with the Nimukei Yosef and rule that
for prohibitions related to forbidden relations that are only a negative
Traveling on Shabbos to Prevent Seclusion 2 313