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the wise woman restored the Sanhedrin, who ruled that he rebelled not obligate a person to take a 40% chance of death in order to save
against the royal Kingdom of King David.
In the Sefer Chasdei Dovid on the Tosefta, he writes that there is no
argument between Rav Yehudah and Rav Shimon. Each one offered
his opinion, and the two opinions do not contradict but complete
each other. His proof is that based only on Rav Yehudah’s opinion, it
would have been correct to hand him alive to Yoav, as he requested,
“Give me just him alone.” How did they know that they could violate
an additional prohibition by cutting off his head? If they were permit-
ted to indirectly cause his death, does that also allow them to kill him
directly? [Two sins are committed when one kills: a) Killing a Jewish
life b) Making a Jew into a murderer. In other words: a) it is forbidden
to spill Jewish blood even by causation, meaning, it is forbidden to
hand over a Jew to gentiles to be killed. All have to be killed rather
than doing this, because handing him over causes the shedding of
innocent blood. This does not apply if no matter what, all will be
killed, in which case handing him over did not cause bloodshed. a)
The actual act of killing is something for which there is no allowance
and this is a serious transgression which the Torah prohibits, that a
Jew should not be a murderer. And about this it is writtem that one
must be killed rather than transgress. This applies even in the case
where all would be killed either way, just as it is forbidden to reveal
ervah or serve idols even at the cost of death. That is why Chasdei
Dovid believes it is not reasonable to say that they cut off his head
based on Rav Yehudah’s reasoning that either way they would all have
been killed. This reasoning would not be sufficient to allow cutting
off his head.]
The Meiri similary clarifies: The dictum “How do you know that
your blood is redder than his?” applies only if the gentile says “Kill
so-and-so and if not I will kill you.” But if he says “Kill so-and-so and
if not I will kill both of you,” it is permissible to kill him. However,
even in this case, it is only permissible to hand him over. Perhaps the
captor will accept ransom or have mercy on him. Killing him directly
is still forbidden. It other words, it is explained by the Meiri that even
406 1 Medical-HalacHic Responsa of Rav ZilbeRstein
14
his fellow.
Rather, the Radvaz’s implication is that any level of danger which
a person is prepared to take upon himself for his own benefit, such
as for monetary profit or honor, and the person assumes he will stay
alive and emerge from the danger unharmed, then he is obligated to
endanger himself in this way in order to save the life of his friend as
well.
The reason for this is because regarding the verse “Do not stand
idly by the blood of your fellowman,” (Vayikra 19:16) Rashi explains
(Tractate Sanhedrin 73a): Do not worry for yourself but examine all
options in attempting to save the life of your friend. Meaning, a per-
son has to do whatever he can and sacrifice whatever he is would be
willing to sacrifice for his own benefit for another. He must do for
the other the maximum he would do for his own interests. Therefore,
if he was willing, in order to advance his own interests, to immerse
in mighty waters, to climb high and dangerous places, or to commit
actions that are liable to land him in prison, although such acts may
be fraught with danger, then he is obligated to undertake the same
amount of danger in order to save his friend’s life. Obviously, he is
willing to do these things for a purpose since the assumption is that
he will remain alive. And this is the intent of Radvaz: If the chances
lean more to emerging alive, then a person is obligated to undertake
the danger in order to save his friend’s life.
However, if the danger is so great that a person fears it and would
not endanger himself even for a fortune of money, such as to jump off
a very high place or run into gunfire, then a person is not obligated to
assume such danger to save his friend.
[An example of this measure of danger is found in the words of
the Sha’ar Hatziyun, (#156:3) which says that a person has to make his
profession temporary and his trade permanent and work at his trade
or profession only as much as he needs for a livelihood and not for
luxuries. So that his evil inclination not convince him that luxuries
are essential, Sha’ar Hatziyun gives us the way to measure this. A
person should ask himself how he would see these things if he was
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