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184 SECTION | I General




  VetBooks.ir  TABLE 11.1 (Continued)        References a


               State
                                 Standard
               Oregon            Daubert     State v. O’Key, 899 P.2d 663 (Or. 1995)
               Pennsylvania      Frye        Pa.R.E. 702(c)
               Rhode Island      Daubert     RI R. Evid. Art. VII, Rule 702
               South Carolina    daubert
               South Dakota      Daubert     State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482 (S.D. 1994)
               Tennessee         Daubert     Tenn. R. Evid. Rule 702
               Texas             Daubert     E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995)
               Utah              Daubert     State v. Rinmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)
               Vermont           Daubert     State v. Brooks, 162 Vt. 26, 30, 643 A.2d 226, 229 (1993)
               Virginia          Other       Va. Code Ann. 8.01-401
               Washington        Frye        State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1994). Reinforced State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1994)
               West Virginia     Daubert     Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1994)
               Wisconsin         Daubert     Wis. Stat. y 907.02(1)
               Wyoming           Daubert     Bunting v. Jamison, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo. 1999)
               a
                See https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/ accessed April 22, 2017.



               post-Daubert, that parties will initially present less than  (1999) at 1176. See also, Rosen v Ciba-geigy Corp, 78 F.3d
                                                                      th
               their best expert evidence in the expectation of a second  316 (7 Cir) cert denied, 519 U.S. 819 (1996) at 318.
               chance should their first trial fail. 49
                                                                  Clearly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert assigned
                Expert testimony is different from lay testimony. One  the trial judge a “gatekeeping” responsibility. This
             difference is the possibility that “junk science” may be used  responsibility is to make a “preliminary assessment of
             to confuse, rather than assist, the trier of fact. Consequently  whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the tes-
             an additional test of admissibility is applied to expert testi-  timony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning
             mony. Such testimony must not only be relevant, but it  or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
             must also be reliable. This concept is explained in the  issue.” Daubert at 589  The “gatekeeper” function requires district
             Daubert case. Justice Breyer, “believe[s] there is an increas-  court judges to screen proffered expert testimony. Ibid  This
             ingly important need for law to reflect sound science.”  Justice  screening is intended to ensure that expert testimony “is not
             Breyer, in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, p. 5.           Ibid
                                                        Justice  only relevant, but reliable.”  To be relevant, the testimony
             Breyer also writes in the Manual on Scientific Evidence:  “requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry
                                                                as a precondition to admissibility.” Daubert at 591 192.  Much
               The judge is the evidentiary gatekeeper (General Electric Co
                                                                has been written about the reliability portion of this
               v Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v Merrel Dow Pharms
                                                                screening.
               Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).). “The judge, without interfering
               with the jury’s role as trier of fact, must determine whether  To meet the reliability standard, the judge must deter-
               purported scientific evidence is “reliable” and will “assist  mine whether testimony is “grounded in the methods and
               the trier of fact” thereby keeping from juries testimony that,  procedures of science.” Daubert, at 590.  Consequently, an
               in Pauli’s sense, isn’t even good enough to be wrong.”  expert must account for “how and why” he or she reached
               Justice Breyer, in Manual on Scientific Evidence, p. 6.  the expert opinion. Kumho, at note 27.  The judge’s determina-
                                                                              Daubert at 594
                  The purpose of Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement “is  tion is “flexible”  so the trial judge has broad
               to make certain that an expert whether basing testimony  latitude  to  determine  how  to  test  an  expert’s
               upon professional studies or personal experience, employs  reliability, Kumho, at 1176  and this determination, may be dif-
               in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that  ferent in a criminal case than in a civil one. Kumho at 1176
               characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant  Nevertheless, guidelines for determining the reliability of
               field.” Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167  expert testimony exist.
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