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Case 2:19-cv-11962-LMA-JVM   Document 106   Filed 08/08/22   Page 26 of 33





                       In Boudreaux and McDonald, the Fifth Circuit explained that Keller, which


               was decided on freedom of speech grounds, “prohibited bars from using mandatory

               dues for activities that are not germane,” but it also held that “state bars could satisfy


               their First Amendment obligation toward mandatory dues by adopting procedures to

               prevent the use of objecting attorneys’ dues for non-germane expenses,” Boudreaux,


               3 F.4th at 755 (citing Keller, 496 U.S. at 14, 17). The Supreme Court “posited, but did


               not hold, that the constitutional minimum set of procedures in the union-fee context,

               set forth in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, would likely be adequate in the bar-


               dues context as well.” Id. (citing Keller, 496 U.S. at 17). The Fifth Circuit then held


               that Hudson sets “the constitutional floor” for procedural safeguards in this context.

               Id. at 758.


                       Hudson provides for an “opt-out” scheme, which requires “a public organization


               collecting mandatory dues and engaging in non-germane conduct” to have procedures

               that (1) “include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee,” (2) “a reasonably


               prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial

               decisionmaker,” and (3) “an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such


               challenges are pending.” Id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310). “The explanation of


               the basis of the fee must include ‘sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the

               [ ] fee.’” Id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306).


                       The Fifth Circuit further expounded on  Hudson  procedures in  McDonald,

               concluding that the Texas Bar’s procedures were inadequate, due both to insufficient


               provision notice and  insufficient  objection  procedures.  Id.  at  254. With respect to





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