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6A The Scout FRIDAY, JUNE 19, 2015
Military Intelligence – Moment in MI history
North Korean invasion of South Korea: Intelligence surprise?
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detected plenty of warnings leading 'HWDFKPHQWVIURPWKHVW&RXQWHU,QWHOOLJHQFH&RUSVLQ-DSDQZHUHWKH¿UVWLQWHOOLJHQFHXQLWV
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence up to the invasion. Between June 1949
and June 1950, FECOM intelligence to arrive in Korea.
Early on June 25, 1950, the North dispatched 1,200 warnings to Wash-
Korean People’s Army crossed the ington of an impending North Korean for potential “explosiveness.” tential threat because it was confi-
38th parallel and invaded the Repub- attack. However, the North Koreans Few analysts believed that North dent the ROK Army was so superior
lic of Korea, ROK. By June 28, the raided along the border so frequently to its Communist neighbor that even
capital Seoul fell and ROK troops fled that these incidents were referred to as Korean leader Kim Il Sung would act if an attack occurred, the ROK could
southward in retreat. The North Kore- “Sunday morning incursions.” militarily without direct Soviet assis- quickly defeat the North. It was com-
ans nearly overwhelmed the peninsula tance. The Department of the Army monly believed that North Korea did
before U.S. forces, under United Na- Additional evidence noted closer G2, Maj. Gen. Leroy Irwin, stated in not have the power to attack the South
tions auspices, could land and estab- to the time of the invasion included a March intelligence report, “Recent unless equipped by the Soviet Union.
lish a toehold at Pusan. evacuation of civilians from the bor- reports of expansion of the North Ko- Analysts unfortunately failed to evalu-
der area, the replacement of civil- rean People’s Army and of major troop ate accurately the significance of T-34
The U.S. had a small intelligence- ian freight shipments with military movements could be indicative of tanks amassed at the border.
gathering capability on the ground in supplies, a large influx of troops, in- preparation for aggressive action but
Korea in 1950. Officers of the Korean cluding concentrations of armor, and Communist military measures in Ko- During Congressional hearings af-
Military Advisory Group, KMAG, stockpiling of weapons and equipment rea will be held in abeyance pending ter the start of the war, Secretary of
worked with every echelon of the in forward areas. the outcome of their program in other State Dean Acheson testified, “Intel-
ROK Army and compiled intelligence areas, particularly Southeast Asia.” ligence was available to the depart-
on the North Korean Army. Because Still, no one thought these indi- Analysts instead believed the North ment prior to the 25th of June, made
KMAG was assigned to the State De- cators to be out of the ordinary. Just Korean leader would resort to more available by the Far East Command,
partment rather than to Gen. Douglas three months earlier, Willoughby as- political initiatives to bring South Ko- the CIA, the Department of the Army,
MacArthur’s Far East Command, FE- sessed that neither South nor North rea within its control. and by the State Department represen-
COM, in Japan, however, its informa- Korea would initiate a civil war in the tatives here and overseas, and shows
tion bypassed his headquarters and spring or summer of 1950. The em- Another reason American officials that all these agencies were in agree-
was instead reported directly to Wash- bassy in Seoul likewise told the State discounted indicators of an attack ment that the possibility for an attack
ington. Department that there was little possi- was an instinctive distrust of Korean on the Korean Republic existed at that
bility of a North Korean invasion. sources who, they believed, overstat- time, but they were all in agreement
To collect the information MacAr- ed the threat for their own purposes. that its launching in the summer of
thur needed, Maj. Gen. Charles Wil- One reason why North Korean ac- General Matthew Ridgway wrote after 1950 did not appear imminent.”
loughby, the FECOM G2, relied on tivities raised little concern was that, the war that MacArthur’s G2 staff did
the Korean Liaison Office, a detach- since the beginning of the Cold War, not rate its local informants as reliable Ultimately, the failure to predict the
ment of intelligence specialists, in Washington was focused more im- because they felt “South Koreans es- North Korean invasion was not one of
Seoul. Additionally, the U.S. Embassy mediately on the Soviet Union. More pecially had a tendency to cry ‘wolf ’ failing to collect appropriate informa-
in Seoul had military attachés and po- likely problem areas were higher intel- when there was no beast in the offing.” tion concerning the enemy’s capabili-
litical analysts studying the military ligence priorities. Korea was fifth on ties. Instead it seemed to be a failure
situation. the Central Intelligence Agency’s list Even more reliable sources were at the higher echelons to analyze the
seen as self-serving. For example, enemy’s intentions accurately.
when the American ambassador in
Seoul reported a heavy buildup by the (Editor’s note: Much of this ar-
North along the 38th parallel, he was ticle was taken from “The Uncertain
thought to be making a case for his Oracle: Some Intelligence Failures
recent request for armor for the ROK Revisited,” by Jim Finley, former
Army. Command Historian for the U.S. Army
Intelligence Center.)
Finally, the U.S. Department of
Defense simply minimized the po-
Eighth US Army trucks move toward the 38th parallel.
