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Deliberative Democracy and Freedom
Rostboll (2008) explored democratic theory and freedom and investigated the “different
dimensions of freedom that make deliberation possible” (p. 3). He has labeled the relationship
between deliberation and freedom as one of “mutual justification and reciprocal reinforcement”
(p. 3) and posed the question “does deliberative democracy make people more free than other
forms of democracy” (p. 209). Rostboll contended that the idea of freedom within the context of
deliberative democracy encompasses many dimensions. His research on the topic seeks to bring
clarity and understanding to the various intersections of freedom and deliberative democracy.
In particular, Rostboll (2008) developed a theory of deliberative democracy that addresses
the role of political freedom. Regarding freedom and deliberative democracy, he stressed the desire
to protect existing and future freedoms: “Deliberative democratic practices do not merely aim at
protecting existing freedoms but also at interpreting and justifying the freedom that should be
protected” (p. 4). Further, he defined deliberative freedom as the combination of four freedoms
such as public autonomy and self-rule, negative freedom and noninterference; free formation of
political opinions (internal autonomy); and freedom as status. He also distinguished between
dimensions and conceptions of freedom and the concept of political freedom to explain his idea of
deliberative freedom and its relationship to earlier models and linkages between democracy and
freedom. As such, negative freedom refers to using democracy to protect an already understood
and demarcated freedom, vis-à -vis noninterference. Conversely, freedom as status relates the
independence of individuals to create new expressions of being free (MacKinnon, 1989).
Rostboll (2008), in his research on the intersections of freedom and deliberative
democracy, instructed that the aim of deliberative democracy is an exercise of freedom. “It is not
so much aimed at transforming preferences but at securing the transformation of preferences in a
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