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north side of a cell tower will use a different C. Appellate Review
signal than a cellphone located on the south
side of the same tower. Hess said that cell tow- On appeal, Petitioner argued that the Fourth
ers are typically spaced widely in rural areas, Amendment’s warrant and probable cause
where a tower’s coverage might reach as far as requirements apply to historical CSLI. Under
20 miles. In an urban area like Detroit, how- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Peti-
ever, each cell site covers “typically anywhere tioner had maintained that he had a subjective
from a half-mile to two miles.” He testified that and objective reasonable expectation of pri-
wireless carriers typically log and store certain vacy over CSLI, and thus, the Stored Commu-
call-detail records of their customers’ calls, in- nications Act’s “reasonable grounds” standard
cluding the date, time, and length of each call; is unconstitutional because it allowed the gov-
the phone numbers engaged on the call; and ernment to conduct a “search” of Petitioner’s
the cell sites where the call began and ended. CSLI without a warrant or probable cause.

With the cell-site data provided by the phone Before trial, the district court had rejected Pe-
company, Hess created maps showing that Pe- titioner’s argument, finding that Petitioner had
titioner’s phone was within a half-mile to two neither a subjective nor objective reasonable
miles of the location of each of the robber- expectation of privacy over CSLI, and thus, the
ies around the time the robberies happened. government had not conducted a “search” re-

Hess used the phone company’s call-detail re- quiring Fourth Amendment protections. Unit-
cords, for example, to show that Petitioner was ed States v. Carpenter, No. 12-20218, 2013 WL
within that distance of a Detroit Radio Shack 6385838, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2013). The
that was robbed around 10:35 a.m. on Decem- Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner
ber 13, 2010. Specifically, the records showed could not have a reasonable expectation of
that at 10:24 a.m. Petitioner’s phone received a privacy of information voluntarily conveyed to
call that lasted about four minutes. At the start a third party. Carpenter v. United States, 819
and end of the call, Petitioner’s phone drew its F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016).
signal from the phone company’s tower 173,
sectors 1 and 2, located southwest of the store APPLICABLE LAW
and whose signals point north-northeast. After
the robbery, Petitioner placed an eight-minute A. Constitutional Provision
call originating at tower 145, sector 3, located
northeast of the store, its signal pointing south- The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right
west; when the call ended, Petitioner’s phone of the people to be secure in their persons,
was receiving its signal from tower 164, sector houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
1, alongside Interstate 94, north of the Radio sonable searches and seizures, shall not be
Shack. Hess provided similar analysis concern- violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
ing the locations of Petitioner’s phone at the probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
time of a December 18, 2010 robbery in De- tion, and particularly describing the place to
troit; a March 4, 2011 robbery in Warren, Ohio; be searched, and the persons or things to be
and an April 5, 2011 robbery in Detroit. seized.”

The jury convicted Petitioner on all the Hobbs B. Statutory Provision
Act counts and all but one of the firearms
counts. 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(c)(1) provides: “A gov-
ernmental entity may require a provider of

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