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nobody disputed: “Defense will be a part of a general offensive. Defense is an indispensable
form of military operations in separate secondary locations, which allows us to save forces
for offensive operations and prepare attacks.” 6
In the conclusive speech, the People’s Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet
Union Timoshenko reminded his audience to keep in mind “the possibility of the simultane-
ous conduct of two, maybe even three, offensive operations on different fronts in the theater
of war, with the purpose of strategically shaking up the enemy’s defense capabilities as widely
7
as possible.” Defense at the primary locations was not foreseen, even theoretically. An opin-
ion, which was prevalent in the Red Army from the moment of its founding, was confirmed
at that conference: the most important thing was to advance with entire armies, fronts, and
groups of fronts; but small formations—regiments or divisions, perhaps even a corps—would
sometimes be left for defense in separate locations. Some agreed that if needed, an entire
field army could be engaged in defense. . . .We must remember that in June 1941, on the
European territory of the USSR, there were twenty-six field armies organized in five fronts,
and a group of reserve armies. A situation in which two armies, side by side, could occupy
themselves with defense in one location, was considered completely improbable, and was not
examined even theoretically.
e conference of the High Command of the Red Army ended at 6  on December
31, 1940. Most of the participants were urgently and secretly sent back to their posts. Only
the most important generals remained in Moscow. Even before the conference was over, at 11
 on December 31, a group of forty-nine of the highest-ranking generals received instruc-
tions for a strategic staff game on maps. e maps denoted battles between the “Easterners”
and “Westerners.” e scope and importance of this game was the largest of all the pre-
war years. Pavlov, the Commander of the Western special military district, commanded the
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“Easterners,” or the Soviet troops. Zhukov, Commander of the Kiev special military district,
led the “Westerners,” meaning the German troops.
Pavlov’s group had twenty-four generals, one rear-admiral, one navy captain of the
first rank, one navy captain of the second rank, and one colonel. Zhukov’s group, which
played the role of the German command, had twenty generals, admirals, and officers besides
Zhukov. e first strategic game began on the morning of January 2, 1941, at the General
Staff of the Red Army. e scenario of the future war was being played out. e supervisor of
the game was Timoshenko, the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR. e referees of
the game consisted of twelve top commanders of the Red Army, including four Marshals of
the Soviet Union. e observers included Joseph Stalin and the entire Politburo.
A colossal battle raged on the giant maps. For the time being just on the maps, the
two most powerful armies on the planet clashed. For several days and nights, without rest or
sleep, the staffs of the two opposing sides evaluated situations, made decisions, gave orders
and directions. For now just on paper, thousands of tanks and airplanes, tens of thousands of
guns and mortars, and millions of soldiers were brought into battle. Hundreds of thousands
of tons of ammunition, fuel, and engineering and medical equipment were dispatched from
the rear. Divisions, corps, and entire armies were going for the breakthrough. Soviet strate-
gists were not working on any defense plans and not making any plans for rebutting a pos-
sible German aggression. ey were thinking of a way to take Koenigsberg, Warsaw, Prague,
Bucharest, Krakow, and Budapest. Soviet preparations for the invasion of Europe neared their
final stage.