Page 338 - The Chief Culprit

Epilogue y 283

copy of the secret agreement reached between Molotov and von Ribbentrop. Dr. Gaus will-
ingly signed an affidavit:

About noon on August 23, 1939, the plane in which I was traveling with von Ribbentrop
landed in Moscow. I was acting as his legal advisor in regard to certain negotiations be-
tween [him] and Stalin. I was not present but there was a counselor from the embassy and
Hilger, who acted as interpreter. Also present was Ambassador Count Schulenburg.
e outcome seemed to be satisfactory to Von Ribbentrop, who expressed the opinion
that Germany would be successful in her proposals.
In the evening a second discussion took place for the purpose of completing and
signing the necessary documents. I had prepared the draft for Herr von Ribbentrop.
Ambassador Count Schulenburg and the counselor from the embassy and Hilger were
also there. Stalin and Molotov carried on the negotiations for the Russian side assisted by
Pavlov, who interpreted.
An agreement was reached regarding the non-aggression pact between Germany and
Soviet Russia, but a phrase regarding the friendly shaping of German-Russian relations
was objected to by Stalin, who said that the Soviet government could not suddenly
publicize a German-Russian friendship after the National Socialist foreign minister had
poured “buckets of putrid ditch water” over them for six years. It was necessary for it to
be reworded.
Beside the non-aggression pact there were negotiations at some length about a special
secret document which in my recollection was called “secret protocol” or “secret addition-
al protocol.” is [was] aimed at the delimitation of the mutual spheres of influence in
the European territories situated between the two countries. I cannot remember whether
the expression “spheres of influence” was used or not. In the document Germany said she
was disinterested in Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, but regarded Lithuania as a part of “her
sphere of influence.” At the same time, Germany wanted to have an interest, but not po-
litical, in the Baltic ports which were free from ice. is, of course, was not acceptable to
the Russians. Obviously, von Ribbentrop was acting on instructions, as he had booked a
telephone call to Hitler, which came through at this time. He was told to accept the Soviet
point of view.
For the Polish territory, a demarcation line was fixed. Whether it was marked exactly
on a map or described in words in the document I cannot remember. e agreement
reached about Poland was to the effect that both powers should settle all questions re-
garding that country at a final meeting. Regarding the Balkans, it was established that
Germany should have only economic interests.
e non-aggression pact and the secret documents were signed at a rather late hour of
the same night.
Approximately one month later, at discussions about the second German-Soviet politi-
cal treaty, the document mentioned above was altered—following a suggestion commu-
nicated by the Soviet government to Berlin earlier—to the effect that Lithuania was to be
taken out of the “German sphere of interest,” except for a “Lappet” [an overhanging piece
of land] adjacent to East Prussia. In return, however, the demarcation line in Poland was
moved further to the east.
At subsequent negotiations, through diplomatic channels, either at the end of 1940 or
the beginning of 1941, this diplomatic “Lappet” was given up by the Germans.