Page 26 - WCBA CLE 6-14-2022
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                new counsel for the defendant. In any event, new counsel appeared for the defendant and opposed the

               motion, and the Supreme  Court granted the plaintiff’s motion.

               The Second Department  held that while noncompliance  with the notice provision of CPLR 321(c) at the
               time a motion is made renders  the Supreme  Court’s determination  of the motion unenforceable, under
               the circumstances, the defendant waived the protective provisions of CPLR 321(c).

               MOORE v CITY OF NEW YORK, 197 AD3d 93 (July 2021) by Barros, J.

               In an action to recover damages for personal injuries  sustained  when the plaintiff was struck by a truck
               owned and operated by the defendant, a jury returned  a verdict in favor of the defendants, finding that
               the truck driver  was not negligent. In its charge to the jury, the Supreme Court instructed that, pursuant
               to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d),  the truck driver was “parked” at a red light and although required
               to signal his intention to turn, he was not required  to signal at least 100 feet before turning his vehicle,
               as the plaintiff contended.

               The Second Department  held that a vehicle stopped for a traffic light is not “parked” such that it is only
               required under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d)  to signal its turn without the need to do so
               continuously  100 feet before turning. As such, the Supreme  Court erred in refusing to give a jury
               instruction  that the truck driver was required  to have continuously  signaled no less than 100 feet before
               turning, pursuant  to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b).



               CRIMINAL CASES:
               PEOPLE v COULIBALY, 198 AD3d 84 (August 2021) by Brathwaite  Nelson, J.

               The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third  degree and
               sentenced to two years imprisonment  followed by postrelease supervision. Nine years later, the
               conviction was vacated and the defendant pleaded  guilty to criminal possession of a controlled
               substance in the third degree in satisfaction of the same indictment  and was sentenced to time served.
               The defendant then moved pursuant  to CPL 160.59 to seal his conviction and the County Court denied
               his motion on the ground that the 10-year period following imposition of sentence had not yet passed.
               The defendant appealed, and the People argued that his appeal should have been dismissed, as there is
               no mechanism  in the CPL to appeal from the denial of a motion pursuant  to CPL 160.59.

               The Second Department  held that although a motion pursuant  to CPL 160.59 relates to a criminal
               matter, the determination  of such a motion is properly characterized as civil in nature. Accordingly, a
               motion pursuant  to CPL 160.59 falls within the court’s civil jurisdiction  and a defendant  may appeal from
               such an order.

               PEOPLE v LOCKLEY, 200 AD3d 117 (November 2021) by Chambers, J.

               In a prosecution for felony murder  and other related charges, the Second Department  held that the
               defendant’s Sixth Amendment  right to confrontation was violated when the People introduced  the
               testimony of a police detective who recounted  statements made to him by a non-testifying accomplice
               which directly implicated  the defendant in the charged crimes. The error was not harmless beyond a
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