Page 28 - WCBA Appellate Practice Committee CLE May 2024-Handout
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McKay v Town of Southampton, 220 AD3d 59 [September 20, 2023] [Justice Ford opinion; Justices
               Connolly, Genovesi, and Wan concur]

               HOLDING: In an action to recover damages for false imprisonment, this Court reversed an order of the
               Supreme Court which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint
               as the defendant failed to establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff, in accepting a sentence of “time
               served,” knowingly consented to the entirety of his confinement or that he did not suffer damages as a
               result of the defendant’s alleged negligence.

               FACTS: The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant alleging false imprisonment and
               negligence. According to the plaintiff, he was arrested by officers of the defendant police department
               for felony charges and placed in a correctional facility. The plaintiff alleged that, a few days after his
               arrest, the District Attorney’s Office consented to the plaintiff’s release pursuant to CPL 180.80 and sent
               a request to the defendant for the plaintiff to be released. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant did
               not respond and the plaintiff remained in the correctional facility for approximately 2.5 months before
               being released. Thereafter, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and was sentenced to “time
               served.” The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court
               granted the defendant’s motion on the ground that the plaintiff did not move for release pursuant to
               CPL 180.80. The court further found that the plaintiff did not incur damages because he agreed to a
               sentence of “time served.” The legality of pretrial detention is governed by CPL 180.80 which requires
               the release of individuals being held in pretrial detention pending action of a Grand Jury after 120 or 144
               hours of custody, unless, among other circumstances, an indictment has been voted. An application by
               the confined individual is required to effectuate their release. As an initial matter, this Court found that
               the plaintiff’s agreement to a plea deal did not serve to waive his claims for false imprisonment and
               negligence. Here, the plaintiff did not argue that his initial confinement was improper, he contended
               instead that the defendant illegally detained him after the District Attorney’s Office requested his
               release. Therefore, this Court held that the claims do not relate to the factual elements of the crime
               charged; instead the claims relate to the issue of whether the defendant improperly failed to release the
               plaintiff from custody when it was required to pursuant to CPL 180.80. With respect to the plaintiff’s
               claim for false imprisonment, although the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to
               judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff did not make an individual application
               for release, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion as the plaintiff raised a
               triable issue of fact as to whether the District Attorney’s request constituted a joint application pursuant
               to CPL 180.80, which may have rendered an additional individual application by the plaintiff
               unnecessary. With respect to the claim of negligence, this Court rejected the defendant’s theory that
               the plaintiff, by pleading guilty and accepting a sentence of “time served,” retroactively consented to his
               own confinement. Notably, the defendant did not cite any statutory authority or legal precedent to
               support this claim. This Court also noted that a logical extension of the defendant’s argument would
               mean that the defendant would be permitted to detain any individual suspected of a crime for an
               indefinite period of time as long as that individual eventually agreed to plead guilty to a sentence of
               “time served.” This result is antithetical to the purpose of CPL 180.80 which mandates the release of an
               individual after a specified period of time if certain requirements are met. This Court also determined
               that the defendant failed to prove, prima facie, as a matter of law that the plaintiff knowingly accepted
               his sentence with regard to his entire confinement or just the period of legal confinement as the
               transcript of the plea proceeding did not specify the amount of “time served” under the plea deal. As a




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