Page 42 - WCBA Appellate Practice Committee CLE May 2024-Handout
P. 42
plaintiffs lacked standing to commence this action. Additionally, the plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment declaring the Local Law null and void.
The Supreme Court denied the separate motions of the City defendants and the intervenors, and granted
the plaintiff’s motion. The court determined that the voter plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Local
Law based upon vote dilution, and that the officeholder plaintiffs and political party plaintiffs had standing
based upon the impact of the Local Law on campaigning. Further, the court found that the Local Law
violated the NY State Constitution, the NY State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law.
The Second Department (Wan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) initially found that the voter
plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the first and second causes of action challenging the Local Law as
violative of the NY State Constitution and the NY State Election Law, respectively. The voter plaintiffs did
not allege that they were treated any differently than noncitizens or that their votes would carry less
weight as compared to the votes of noncitizens. The voter plaintiffs also failed to explain how the alleged
vote dilution affected them differently than every other member of the public. However, the Court found
that the voter plaintiffs did have standing to assert the third cause of action, challenging the Local Law on
the grounds that a referendum was required under the Municipal Home Rule Law.
With regard to the political party plaintiffs, the Court found that they lacked standing to challenge the
Local Law in this action, as the allegations were neither sufficiently concrete nor particularized to establish
a cognizable injury, or were too conjectural to serve as a basis for standing. With regard to the
officeholder plaintiffs, the Court found that these plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Local Law as
invalid on the basis of the NY State Constitution and the NY State Election Law, as they have a cognizable
interest in ensuring the final vote tally accurately reflects the legally valid votes cast. Since the each of the
officeholder plaintiffs intended to seek reelection, they possess standing to challenge the Local Law on
the ground that it may result in those plaintiffs losing reelection due to the improper inclusion of votes
from noncitizens.
With regard to the validity of the Local Law, the Second Department held that the Supreme Court properly
granted those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment declaring the Local
Law null and void on the ground that it violates the NY State Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule
Law. The Court determined that contrary to the City defendants’ and the intervenors’ interpretation of
the term “citizen” in article II, section 1 of the NY State Constitution, the reference to “citizen[s]” pertains
to United States citizens. Moreover, the Court concluded that the plain language of article II, section 1 of
the NY State Constitution reflects that it applies to municipal elections, and is not limited to statewide
elections. Further, under Municipal Home Rule Law § 23, a local law shall be subject to mandatory
referendum if it, among other things, changes the method of nominating, electing, or removing an elective
officer. The Court found that the Local Law changed the “method” of electing an elective officer in that it
created a new class of voters entitled to vote in municipal elections and changed the eligibility criteria for
voting, thereby changing the election process. Accordingly, the enactment of the Local Law without a
referendum violated Municipal Home Rule Law.
However, the Second Department found that the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch which
was for summary judgment declaring the Local Law null and void on the ground that it violates the NY
State Election Law, as in light of the plain language of Section 1-102, the City was permitted to enact
legislation inconsistent with Section 5-102(1), which provides that eligibility to vote in a municipal
election is dependent upon United States citizenship.
39