Page 6 - Malayan Story
P. 6
MALAYAN STORY
PROLOGUE
“EMERGENCY”
The name “Emergency” as used in political circles would have various applications today, but in post
Second World War Malaya and in the UK it meant only one thing. It referred to the Malayan
Emergency, a Communist insurrection in the Federation of Malaya (now Malaysia) from 1948 to
1960, which posed a challenge not only to the British imperial regime, but also to peaceful political
transition to Malayan independence. At the height of the Emergency, in the early 1950s, some
40,000 regular soldiers, 70,000 police, and a quarter of a million “home guards” were ranged against
8,000 guerrillas; the Emergency cost some 11,000 lives.
Some have seen the Communist rising as resulting from a strategy orchestrated by the Union of viet
Socialist Republics for revolution in Asia, launched at the Calcutta Conference in February 1948. Its
origins, nevertheless, can be traced to World War II. During the occupation of Malaya by Japan
(1942-1945), the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist party (MCP) had been in the forefront of
resistance to the Japanese. After the war, the MCP expected to assume a leading role in shaping
Malaya's future. In the immediate post-war years, however, the party found itself increasingly
marginalized; the cementing of Anglo-Malay cooperation, symbolized by the creation of the
Federation of Malaya in February 1948, frustrated the MCP's political ambitions, while
administrative and legal constraints placed on the trade union movement restricted the party's
influence in industrial relations. With legal forms of protest apparently exhausted, the MCP resorted
to military action. On June 16, 1948, three European planters were murdered at Sungei Siput (Perak).
A state of emergency was immediately declared in parts of Perak and Johor, and was extended to the
whole of the Federation two days later. Initially, the Communists focused on economic targets,
attacking the rubber and tin industries. While failing to cripple the Malayan economy, the MCP
achieved considerable success, killing European managers and disrupting the means of production.
At first, British counter-insurgency measures were hampered by poor intelligence and inappropriate
military tactics. With confidence in the government ebbing away, a fresh initiative was required. In
1950, the Director of Operations, Sir Harold Briggs, embarked upon breaking the link between the
MCP and the Chinese peasants, or squatters, living in the rural areas. To achieve this objective,
Briggs began moving squatters into “New Villages”, where they could be protected and prevented
from communicating with the Communists. Before the effects of the Briggs Plan could be felt,
however, the British suffered a setback. On October 6, 1951, the High Commissioner, Sir Henry
Gurney, was assassinated by guerrillas. Gurney's successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, was
appointed both High Commissioner and Director of Operations. Although a military man, Templer
sought to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population by promoting not only political
advance, but also social welfare. The funds for Templer's ambitious schemes were provided by the
economic boom which followed in the wake of the Korean War. In September 1953, Templer was
able to declare the first “white”, or non-Communist, area, and by the time he left office in 1954, the
crisis of the Emergency had passed. The election of the Alliance government in 1955 removed what
little remaining legitimacy the MCP possessed, and on July 31, 1960 the government of independent
Malaya declared the Emergency to be at an end.i
The “New Villages” mentioned above were surrounded by barbed wire and guard posts were set up
in the village centre. Guards on the gates to each village searched every person who went in or out.
It was at this time that missionaries were coming out of China and Sir Gerald, who knew something
of the China Inland Mission, sent an invitation to Chinese speaking people to work in the New
Villages of Malaya, hoping that our presence there would help to take away some of the anti-British
feeling that had been engendered by the enforced move from their homes into the New Villages.
6
PROLOGUE
“EMERGENCY”
The name “Emergency” as used in political circles would have various applications today, but in post
Second World War Malaya and in the UK it meant only one thing. It referred to the Malayan
Emergency, a Communist insurrection in the Federation of Malaya (now Malaysia) from 1948 to
1960, which posed a challenge not only to the British imperial regime, but also to peaceful political
transition to Malayan independence. At the height of the Emergency, in the early 1950s, some
40,000 regular soldiers, 70,000 police, and a quarter of a million “home guards” were ranged against
8,000 guerrillas; the Emergency cost some 11,000 lives.
Some have seen the Communist rising as resulting from a strategy orchestrated by the Union of viet
Socialist Republics for revolution in Asia, launched at the Calcutta Conference in February 1948. Its
origins, nevertheless, can be traced to World War II. During the occupation of Malaya by Japan
(1942-1945), the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist party (MCP) had been in the forefront of
resistance to the Japanese. After the war, the MCP expected to assume a leading role in shaping
Malaya's future. In the immediate post-war years, however, the party found itself increasingly
marginalized; the cementing of Anglo-Malay cooperation, symbolized by the creation of the
Federation of Malaya in February 1948, frustrated the MCP's political ambitions, while
administrative and legal constraints placed on the trade union movement restricted the party's
influence in industrial relations. With legal forms of protest apparently exhausted, the MCP resorted
to military action. On June 16, 1948, three European planters were murdered at Sungei Siput (Perak).
A state of emergency was immediately declared in parts of Perak and Johor, and was extended to the
whole of the Federation two days later. Initially, the Communists focused on economic targets,
attacking the rubber and tin industries. While failing to cripple the Malayan economy, the MCP
achieved considerable success, killing European managers and disrupting the means of production.
At first, British counter-insurgency measures were hampered by poor intelligence and inappropriate
military tactics. With confidence in the government ebbing away, a fresh initiative was required. In
1950, the Director of Operations, Sir Harold Briggs, embarked upon breaking the link between the
MCP and the Chinese peasants, or squatters, living in the rural areas. To achieve this objective,
Briggs began moving squatters into “New Villages”, where they could be protected and prevented
from communicating with the Communists. Before the effects of the Briggs Plan could be felt,
however, the British suffered a setback. On October 6, 1951, the High Commissioner, Sir Henry
Gurney, was assassinated by guerrillas. Gurney's successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, was
appointed both High Commissioner and Director of Operations. Although a military man, Templer
sought to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population by promoting not only political
advance, but also social welfare. The funds for Templer's ambitious schemes were provided by the
economic boom which followed in the wake of the Korean War. In September 1953, Templer was
able to declare the first “white”, or non-Communist, area, and by the time he left office in 1954, the
crisis of the Emergency had passed. The election of the Alliance government in 1955 removed what
little remaining legitimacy the MCP possessed, and on July 31, 1960 the government of independent
Malaya declared the Emergency to be at an end.i
The “New Villages” mentioned above were surrounded by barbed wire and guard posts were set up
in the village centre. Guards on the gates to each village searched every person who went in or out.
It was at this time that missionaries were coming out of China and Sir Gerald, who knew something
of the China Inland Mission, sent an invitation to Chinese speaking people to work in the New
Villages of Malaya, hoping that our presence there would help to take away some of the anti-British
feeling that had been engendered by the enforced move from their homes into the New Villages.
6
