Page 257 - The Social Animal
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Self-Justification 239


           of both self-esteem and narcissism. In short, when their inflated
           opinion of themselves is threatened, narcissistic people get angry and
           behave more aggressively than the average person. Christina Salmi-
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           valli and her colleagues suggest that this syndrome, high narcissis-
           tic self-esteem, is not genuine high self-esteem at all, but rather, it is
           paper-thin, self-aggrandizing, and based on feelings of insecurity.
           They found that this form of self-esteem is present in schoolyard
           bullies, while those youngsters with genuinely high self-esteem are
           more secure and do not engage in bullying. Indeed, such individuals
           are more likely to try to defend the victims of bullying.



           Discomfort or Self-Perception?

           The theory of cognitive dissonance is a motivational theory. Accord-
           ing to the theory, it is the discomfort caused by a threat to the self-
           concept that motivates people to change their beliefs or behavior. But
           how do we know that people going through these experiments actu-
           ally experience discomfort? Perhaps it is simply a matter of self-per-
           ception. This possibility is nicely captured by the humorous
           expression: “How do I know what I think until I see what I do?”
           Many years ago, Daryl Bem developed the notion of self-percep-
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           tion and applied it to some of the research on dissonance theory. Bem
           suggested that the people who are undergoing attitude and behavior
           change in these situations may not be experiencing discomfort and
           may not be motivated to justify themselves. Rather, they may simply
           be observing their own behavior in a cool, calm, and dispassionate
           way, and drawing a conclusion from their observations. Bem’s sug-
           gestion makes a lot of sense. As you know, we all have a strong ten-
           dency to make these kinds of attributions—both about other people
           and ourselves. For example, suppose there was a huge array of
           desserts on display in a cafeteria and, after looking at all of them, you
           chose a wedge of rhubarb pie. If I was observing you in the cafete-
           ria, I would guess that you like rhubarb pie. Bem suggests that, by
           observing your own behavior, you would draw the same conclusion:
           You would say: “Hey, I freely chose the rhubarb pie, therefore, I guess
           I must like it!”
               So far there is no disagreement between Bem and me. But here
           is where it gets interesting: Suppose you were a Yale student and you
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