Page 46 - Australian Defence Magazine May 2022

46 DEFENCE IN THE NORTH
MAY 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
In fact, these adversary boats would be even more con- strained operating in our backyard than the RAN’s Collins- class would be in theirs, given they were not designed with the range and endurance of the Collins in mind.
A potential submarine threat to Australia in the event of a conflict would therefore come from the nuclear-powered attack submarines, which can hold shipping in and out of major Australian ports under threat by
interdicting the choke points leading to
Australia such as the Sunda and Lombok
Strait – or the ports themselves.
from overseas, along with vital fertiliser stocks for the ag- ricultural sector.
The former has been put into even sharper focus in recent months, with the announcement of the impending closure of two of Australia’s four oil refineries in October 2021.
Australia today imports more than 90 per cent of its refined fuels, with 2019-20 figures for automotive petrol showing a third was imported from Singa- pore and South Korea supplying another 29 per cent, while diesel supplies came from Singapore (24 per cent), Japan (19
Australia is of course highly dependent
on seaborne traffic for its sustainment. Ac-
cording to a joint report by the Australian
Naval Institute and UNSW Canberra’s
Naval Studies Group, over 99 per cent of
Australia’s imports and exports by volume
and over 79 per cent by value are dependent on shipping.
Figures from 2017-19 show that the combined value of Australia’s seagoing international imports and exports was over $600 billion, with 5,879 ships making 32,801 port calls at Australian ports between 2016 and 2017.
Of these, 5,743 cargo ships made 17,068 voyages to Aus- tralian waters from overseas ports. This is in addition to the dependence of Australia’s fuel supplies on imports
per cent), and China (16 per cent). Onshore fuel holdings are also insuffi- cient to meet the country’s commitments. As a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Australia is supposed to maintain oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days’ worth of net-oil imports but has been non-compli-
ant with its stockholding obligation since 2012.
Figures released at the end of November 2020 showed Australia had 63 days’ worth of oil reserves, and 86 days’ worth when including oil en-route to Australia. The Com- monwealth has since moved to shore up the country’s fuel se- curity, putting forward a bill that if passed would see, among other things, importers required to increase diesel stockhold-
ings by 40 per cent from 1 July 2024. Another threat would of course be the use of cruise missile-equipped boats, able to strike land targets hundreds of kilometres away from the coast. China’s submarine-launched YJ-18B supersonic cruise missile has been reported to have a range of up to 500 km (270 nm), put- ting many strategic targets in Australia at
risk from such attacks.
CHINA’S SUBMARINE CAPABILITY
China’s nuclear – and conventionally- powered attack and ballistic missile submarines – are understood to have improved by leaps and bounds from the days when they were regarded a noisy joke. The country invested heavily in its defence capabilities and progressed technologically over the past decades.
The PLAN has nuclear-powered sub- marines for operations further afield. The early, and very limited Type 091 (Han- class) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are quickly being replaced by more modern 7,000-ton Type 093 and 093G (both known as the Shang-class), which are equipped with vertical-launch tubes for cruise missiles in addition to torpe- does. These can launch YJ-12, YJ-18 and
LEFT: PLAN Type 093 or Shangclass submarine
“POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES IN THE REGION ARE OBVIOUSLY CHINA, AND PROBABLY TO A LESSER EXTENT, RUSSIA”
CHINESE MOD