Page 54 - Australian Defence Magazine May 2022

54 SEAPOWER SUBMARINES
MAY 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
According to sources close to the talks, Morrison refused to meet Pommellet and Reynolds insisted on a contract change that would oblige Naval Group to meet its offer of a 60 per cent target or face termination for breach. Pom- mellet, under pressure from negative headlines, agreed to what sources describe as a ‘fair deal’ with Defence Sec- retary Greg Moriarty – but the damage to Naval Group’s public reputation was already done.
In May, Minister Dutton and Minister Price appointed new members to the Submarine Advisory Committee, which ‘provides independent critical peer review of the current and projected submarine capability’: Donald Kirk- land, Jim Hughes, and Donald McCormack.
LEFT: HMAS Rankin at sea during Exercise Ausindex 21
acquisition cost estimate of $50 billion in 2016 constant dollars announced at the outset.
“Naval Group work collaboratively with Defence since then to achieve substantial progress, and there are no ex- treme program strategic risks.”
On 31 August, Moriarty responded: “[This] is a reflection of... the good working relationship that you and your team has established with Naval Group and LMA. I will ensure that the good progress to date is part of the advice we take to Government, and you will hear that message repeated in the 2+2 [Ministerial Consultations] with France.”
At the time this email was sent, it is unclear whether Moriarty knew about the forthcoming decision to ditch the program. The 2+2 consultations were held the same day.
In hindsight, two pictures emerge: one of significant American influence in Australia’s defence capability de- cision-making; and another of an effort from within the Morrison government to undermine its own program.
WHO KILLED THE ATTACK-CLASS?
Was this all Morrison’s own initiative, or did someone with an ambition for a nuclear-powered RAN influence his deci- sion-making? The answer is unknowable, but it has caused a dramatic backflip in Defence’s capability planning with clear consequences for Australia’s military readiness.
To justify the backflip, Morrison said: “Australia was not in a position at the time we took the decision back in 2016 to build and operate a nuclear-powered submarine.”
However, that same year Naval Group’s chief Herve Guillou said Australia could have a nuclear submarine; one of the reasons the French submarines were chosen was their ability to switch to nuclear propulsion from 2030; and ADM understands the French offered to switch the Attack class to nuclear propulsion and were turned down.
Yet now the first nuclear-powered boat may not hit the wa- ter until the 2040s. No matter who killed the Attack-class, or why they killed it, surely we could have done better than that.
PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR
This goes far beyond submarines. The mystery over who killed the Attack class fits a pattern of behaviour (predating the Morrison government) that was also evident in the re- placement of the Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters, the MRH 90 Taipans and the Elbit (ELSA) Battle Manage- ment System (BMS).
The pattern is simple: generate negative press about a platform, then pin the blame on defence industry for a costly replacement.
For example, in 2018, editor Nigel Pittaway reported that “someone in Defence or Government, or both, is actively suppressing any good news stories regarding Tiger.
“Tiger was singled out in the 2016 Defence White Paper for criticism, the only platform to be treated in this manner, and it was also the subject of an Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report in September 2016... that listed no fewer than 76 ‘deficiencies’ which, according to informed
“IN JUNE, MEDIA REPORTS SUGGESTED THAT MORIARTY TRIED TO PREVENT CDRE BROWN FROM APPEARING IN FRONT OF SENATE ESTIMATES”
Interestingly, Hughes is a for- mer vice president of submarines at Newport News Shipbuilding, the company that constructs the nuclear-powered Virginia class sub- marines for the US Navy, and Kirk- land is Chairman of the Board of Huntington Ingalls Industries, the company that owns Newport News Shipbuilding. The Virginia-class
submarines are (at the time of writing) a likely contender for Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarine fleet.
In June, media reports suggested that Moriarty tried to pre- vent CDRE Brown from appearing in front of Senate Estimates. In July, Morrison met US President Joe Biden and British PM Boris Johnson on the sidelines of the G7. By this point there had been regular leaks appearing in the media on the ‘troubled state’ of the Attack class program – including a ‘se- nior government source’ speaking to the AFR, who revealed that VADM Mead was sent to Washington DC on Morrison’s
instructions in late August.
On August 27 2021 – around the time VADM Mead was
in Washington – Greg Sammut, General Manager Subma- rines for CASG, sent an email to Moriarty that has since been obtained by the media under FOI. Sammut said: “The schedule forecasts delivery of the first Attack class subma- rine within the window August 2033 to February 2035 at a confidence level of 80 per cent.
“The updated program cost estimate is $46.4 billion in 2016 constant dollars, which remains within the original
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