Page 56 - Australian Defence Magazine May 2022

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MAY 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
sources, were actually capabilities not specified in the origi- nal ARH requirements.”
The drip feed of negative stories around Tiger continued, prompting Airbus Australia’s then-CEO Andrew Mathewson to publicly call for an ‘open competition’ to replace the plat- form amid media reports that Defence was negotiating a sole source foreign military sales acquisition of the Boeing Apache – which is, of course, what ended up happening in early 2021.
In another example, Defence grounded its fleet of MRH 90 Taipan helicopters in July 2021, which prompted media stories quoting anonymous Army aviators alleging the heli- copters are “no longer safe to fly” following “potentially cat- astrophic” maintenance issues. These turned out to involve the Army’s own software (the computerised maintenance system) that was unable to adequately track flight hours logged by components that had swapped between aircraft.
A further investigation by ADM revealed that the com- ponents in question were not critical to flight safety and the decision to ground the fleet was made suddenly, even though Army’s ‘faulty’ software had been used for years.
Six months later, Minister Dutton announced the gov- ernment was negotiating to buy up to 40 Sikorsky UH- 60M Black Hawk battlefield mobility helicopters to re- place the Taipans.
pattern of behaviour in mind, ADM asked Defence whether the Hawkei’s route to Final Operational Capability (FOC) will be modified or delayed. Defence acknowledged receipt of the question but never provided an answer.
HIDDEN AGENDAS
This is not to say that the companies mentioned here are blameless, but there is clear pattern emerging: the Coali- tion government publicly undermines its own programs. It remains unclear who exactly is responsible.
In the case of the Tiger ARH, who exactly wanted the Apache badly enough to single out the Tiger for criticism in the White Paper and suppress positive news of the platform until it was politically expedient to replace it?
In the case of the Attack-class, who leaked confidential information about negotiations with Naval Group, and why? In the case of the MRH 90, who ordered a very sudden and public grounding of the fleet despite the longstanding use of Army software in question, generating what they must have known would be a suite of negative headlines? Who- ever it was certainly laid convenient groundwork for the an-
nouncement of the fleet’s replacement shortly afterwards. In the case of ELSA’s BMS, who leaked news of the with- drawal to the media and which ‘military insiders’ subsequent-
ly made inaccurate public allegations of Israeli spy-craft?
In the case of the Thales Hawkei, who prompted De- fence to publicly resurface a ‘braking issue’, which two ministers and an independent body had previously agreed
was no longer an issue?
Most recently, a classified engineering assessment criti-
cal of the anticipated performance of the Hunter class frig- ates was leaked to the media, prompting Minister Dutton to say ‘there is no Plan B’ – funnily enough, the same words used about the Attack-class prior to the big reveal of Plan B. Who leaked that assessment to the media, and why?
But all these leaks and political manoeuvres must surely cause us to wonder: how exactly does Australia make de- fence capability decisions? Is it on the basis of strategic justification and due commercial process? Or is it on the personal preferences of an elite few? ■
ABOVE: Minister for Defence Peter Dutton, Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price and Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mike Noonan speak with crew members of HMS Astute at HMAS Stirling
“THE MYSTERY OVER WHO KILLED THE ATTACK CLASS FITS A PATTERN OF BEHAVIOUR”
In yet another example, Army suddenly withdrew Elbit’s BMS from service in May 2021, and me- dia subsequently cited ‘anonymous military insiders’ who claimed Is- rael could use the Australian sys- tem as a backdoor to spy on the United States. As it later turned out, the actual reason for the with-
drawal was the ‘looming expiry’ of provisional Defence ac- creditation for the BMS’ Version 7.1 software.
ADM understands the Commonwealth had decided not to patch Version 7.1 while it waited for ELSA’s software update (Version 9.1, which was delayed for not meeting contractual requirements). Instead, it jettisoned the whole system and ‘military insiders’ made public allegations of Is- raeli spy-craft. This was publicly refuted by ELSA Manag- ing Director Paul McLachlan – who was later to be proved correct by Defence’s own admission in Senate Estimates – but the damage to ELSA’s reputation was already done.
A fifth example: on 04 March this year, the ABC ‘re- vealed’ that Defence was not accepting delivery of Thales’ Hawkei vehicles due to ‘braking issues’ and fears over sol- diers’ safety. In a statement provided to ADM, Defence said: “Army will not accept these vehicles into service until the vehicles are safe to operate.”
Yet over a year earlier, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) said Thales had developed a software fix, that ad- ministrative controls would prevent the issue from occurring until the fix was rolled out, and that the brakes were ‘no longer a major issue’. Initial Operating Capability was reached on 20 May 2021, and in July 2021 Minister Dutton and Minister Price announced the braking issue was resolved in a press release that is still available online at the time of writing.
So why did Defence contradict itself? With the above
DEFENCE