Page 70 - Australian Defence Magazine Sep-Oct 2022

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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
suggest otherwise. Army must be able to fulfil this role giv- en that there is no viable alternative in the short to medium term,” he said.
“So, is Land 400 Phase 3 going to result in billions of dollars being spent on a capability that is at risk of defeat to a lightly armed adversary force armed with
UAVs and modern guided weapons? Should
we abandon it and procure UAVs and mis-
siles instead? The short answer is no.
“Equally, it is hardly surprising that late model drones and the best anti-armour weapons that the West manu- factures, designed with sophisticated target acquisition sensors, guidance systems and advanced warheads are defeating tanks and IFV developed four decades ago. The
“You could be forgiven for thinking that a
UAV and missile mix pre-ordains success in
combat. In Ukraine we are observing yet an-
other conflict in which military vehicles like thesearebeingdestroyedinnumbersbywhat
seem to be cheap and readily available anti-
armour missiles, as well as armed drones.
While it is thankfully true that Ukrainians
have destroyed Russian armour with drones
and anti-armour weapons designed for this purpose, this does not in itself negate the utility of this capability.”
BRIG Langford said observers shouldn’t be shocked at the scale of the losses in Ukraine when the scale of the forces involved are taken into consideration, and infantry, armour and artillery as well as the naval, air, space and informational power of both sides are widely involved.
“IF YOU DON’T BELIEVE ME, TRY PLAYING
IT WITH ONLY TWO ELEMENTS AGAINST SOMEONEWHORETAINS ALL THREE”
vast majority lack the survivability of mod- ern armour, such as soft and hard kill Active Protection Systems (APS) and the benefits of integrated command, control and communi- cations systems, which are vital for mobile forces to operate under an effective air de- fence umbrella,” he explained.
“Indeed, it is certainly the case that APS, especially from the anti-armour vector known as ‘top-attack’, represents the latest upgrade of protection against anti-armour systems. With regards to the current conflict, to date, there has not been a single APS-ac-
tive armoured vehicle destroyed in Ukraine. Moreover, ve- hicle tactics typically employed by Russian forces are con- ceived around ‘mass’ as a capability in itself where ‘quantity has a quality of its own’, with less regard to APS and the survival of a single or low number of IFV.”
BRIG Langford also noted that Russian vehicles are so obviously poorly sustained, maintained and operated and it