Page 72 - Australian Defence Magazine Sep-Oct 2022

72 COMBINED ARMS
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
forces with multiple options to produced combined-arms outcomes,” he asserted.
“Furthermore, it is absolutely the case that militaries who have been recently venerated for their use of drones and other technologies in oft-mentioned examples – like the Azerbaijani and Israeli militaries for example – are not necessarily the ‘wonder weapon’ cases they appear to be at first glance. Forbes, for example, makes no suggestion that Israel have radically altered their approach to com- bined arms warfare by adopting radically new fighting con- cepts and tactics or have abandoned their combined-arms approaches.”
He added that, while drones contributed to the Azerbai- jani success, they did not obviate the need for combined- arms ground manoeuvre and a key lesson
to be drawn from the analysis is that com-
bined-arms teams must incorporate mobile
short range air defence systems in order to
avoid exposing their weaknesses and en-
abling them to apply their strengths.
LEFT: An M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment conducts a live-fire demonstration
tempts to use tempo and surprise to attack and paralyse command and control systems.
“It aims to defeat the enemy’s cohesion and will to fight by ‘destroying’ the enemy’s plan rather than seeking to an- nihilate its physical forces,” he said.
“Army sees the employment of its close combat forces as an elemental feature of how it seizes and controls land ob- jectives in close combat, as well as how it operates as part of a joint system across Australia’s near region. The ADF’s land force is not the Russian Army and operates in a differ- ent way which leverages strengths, and offsets weaknesses.”
Therefore, BRIG Langford said Land 400 is needed to plug the M113 capability gap with an effective and deploy- able solution, in terms of protecting soldiers in close combat.
“It will equip a significant component of Army’s combat forces, including infantry, combat engineers, artillery fire teams, medics, mechanics, trades-people, logisticians and headquarters elements. A calculation based on 450 IFVs, each with a capacity to transport three crew and six passen- gers, means that 3050 soldiers are afforded the advantages of moving and fighting under armour, greatly improving their chances of success in combat, as evidenced by previous anal- ysis concerning the M1 Abrams tank acquisition,” he noted.
“As a first world nation, the acquisition of both tank and IFV reflect on a nation that understands that it must conduct these inherently dangerous roles but that it also places high value on pro- tecting the lives of the soldiers that it asks so much from in high threat environments. Army is paying attention to the need to be an agile and effective member of the joint force. Re- sponding to the challenges of future warfare must recognise war’s unchanging nature, in
“Indeed, it is now the case that we know
that the very assertion by some that the Rus-
sian combined-arms approach has been de-
feated by Ukrainian drones and anti-armour
weapons only is a gross simplification of the
root causes. These comments are simplistic
as they ignore a large number of causal rea-
sons affecting Russian performance, specifically a lack of ef- fective doctrine, training, logistics and equipment,” he said.
“The Russian inability to organise as effective combined- arms teams and synchronise combined-arms effects is therefore more likely caused by inadequate training, prepa- ration and coordination, rather than simply drone attacks. This is why the Russians have suffered the kind of defeats in Ukraine that we did not expect. Drones are exploiting weaknesses in the Russian application of combined-arms, not negating the concept of it.
“While drones and anti-armour weapons are exacting a toll on disorganised and disparate Russian forces – the anti-thesis of combined arms – they are not the root cause of this poor performance.”
BRIG Langford said Army’s combine arms Manoeuvre Warfare approach differs greatly from that of Russian Ground Forces because it seeks to avoid attrition and at-
addition to reflecting its changing character.” BRIG Langford concluded that Army’s initial response is four-fold: First, con- ceptualising how it employs land warfare – especially across the Indo-Pacific region – will require continual review to ensure they remain effective against
contemporary and forecasted threats.
Secondly, he said Army must continue its focus on how it
operationally generates its forces, to include how it trains, educates, and prepares; thirdly it must also continue to prioritise development and application of emerging tech- nologies, to generates the type of “small, cheap and many” tactical asymmetries he said is needed to win in war.
“And lastly, Army must continue to balance its capa- bilities to ensure maximum utility to the joint force – this includes planned acquisition of long-range offensive fires, the ability to set and command operational theatres through battle management systems and its contribution to joint force projection through planned acquisition and upgrade of its aviation and littoral projection capabilities,” he concluded. ■
“THE FUTURE IFV APPEALS TO THE PROMISE OF UNPRECEDENTED FIREPOWER, PROTECTION AND MOBILITY FOR THE ARMY”
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