Page 29 - Australian Defence Magazine March-April 2022

MARCH-APRIL 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
DEFENCE BUSINESS NORTHERN DEFENCE 29
buying 200 heavily armoured vehicles that are infantry fighting vehicles by another name.”
But perhaps it is worth delving a little deeper into Austra- lia’s strategic objective of ‘deterring China in the Pacific.’ Deterring China from what? And where ex-
actly in the Pacific (a famously large place)?
What forces will Australia deter China with,
and how will those forces be delivered to
where they need to be?
A better understanding of these questions should inform any decision to shrink or oth- erwise amend the scope of Land 400 Phase 3, and indeed any major ADF procurement, and inform the future of land power beyond northern Australia.
DETERRING AN INVASION
The answer to the first two questions – what the ADF must deter China from, and where – has probably leapt to most reader’s minds: an occupation of Taiwan.
Keep in mind, an outright occupation is highly risky for China. The PLA would have to ferry huge numbers of inex- perienced troops across the treacherous Taiwan Strait (many of whom would probably be on re-purposed fishing vessels) past allied submarines and aircraft and long-range guided weapons, to land on one of 13 well-defended beaches on the island’s west coast. And that’s only the opening stage – oc- cupying Taiwan in the longer-term is a whole other problem.
This means the strategic goal of bringing Taiwan to heel may not be achieved through an outright occupation. Instead, Beijing could seek a geostrategic fait accompli, such as hold- ing the country hostage through a naval blockade (similar to
Russia’s troop build-up near Ukraine), or fos- tering a political crisis and then intervening. It could also keep slowly chipping away at the island’s independence over ten or more years, being careful to keep the occasional flare-up of tensions below the threshold of a war that could involve the US.
So, with what forces will Australia deter China from going down a more explosive path? Or perhaps a better question: with what forces is Australia most likely to tip
the military balance in favour of the United States?
In a war over an island thousands of kilometres from Aus- tralia, the logical answer is sea and air power. To this end, the acquisition of Australian nuclear-powered submarines has deterrent value: their capacity to remain underwater (and out of sight) longer than diesel-electric variants means they increase the risks and costs of an amphibious invasion. Similarly, recent whispers of an additional squadron of Australian F-35 fighter jets may help the US prevent the PLA from achieving air superiority over Taiwan, and ad- ditional tanker or heavy lift capabilities would help airlift supplies onto a blockaded island. All these capabilities
bring deterrent value.
“SO, WITH WHAT FORCES WILL AUSTRALIA DETER CHINA FROM GOING DOWN A MORE EXPLOSIVE PATH?”
DEFENCE