Page 30 - Australian Defence Magazine March-April 2022

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DEFENCE BUSINESS
NORTHERN DEFENCE
MARCH-APRIL 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
But what of land power? What cost will 75 Australian tanks stationed in Adelaide and Queensland, or 450 IFVs spread across northern Australia, impose on Chinese forces moving towards Taiwan?
Unless the Prime Minister decides that it is worth pre- positioning Australian troops in Taiwan –
an unlikely move – it is difficult to imagine
the ADF loading heavy armour onto HMAS
LEFT: An Australian Army M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank fires its main armament during live-fire training
the primary task of ADF land power beyond northern Aus- tralia is regional intervention and stabilisation. Do all three combat brigades each need an organic IFV capability as well as Boxers in order to respond to a failed state in the South Pacific?
Returning to Shoebridge’s argument: “The army already has the world-class Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles...
and it’s already buying 200 heavily armoured vehicles that are infantry fighting vehicles by another name.”
Additionally, one of the two ships that would transport them, HMAS Adelaide, recently became stranded in Tonga suffering widespread electrical power failures.
Canberra or Adelaide and sailing through salvos of Chinese missiles. Dollar for dollar, land power simply does not bring the same deterrent value as sea or air power in the Indo-Pacific.
Of course, the sole purpose of Australian land power is not just a defence of Taiwan. Few would argue against the need for a com- bined arms capability capable of reacting to the unexpected, wherever it occurs.
“AT PRESENT, THE MOST PRESSING OF THOSE REQUIREMENTS IS TO INCREASE DETERRENCE IN THE ARCHIPELAGOS OF THE INDO-PACIFIC”
What is clear, however, is that northern Australia itself carries great deterrent value. It is uniquely positioned as a staging area for American forces in the Indo-Pacific, al- most akin to Guam in strategic value but far less vulnerable. Investments in defence infrastructure across northern Australia are welcomed in Washington for good reason.
DEEP WATER PRESSURE
These questions would not be so pressing had the government – for better or worse – not torpedoed the French submarine
contract in favour of an as-yet-undecided nuclear-pow- ered submarine.
The sheer cost involved – by some estimates 50 per cent higher than the Attack class, which was itself forecast at $90 billion – undoubtedly places pressure on all large pro- grams to justify their scope. Three combat brigades each with three different varieties of armoured vehicle is cer- tainly a nice thing for the Army to have on hand, but surely the Minister’s office is wondering, does the Army really need that many?
As Andrew Davies, ASPI Senior Fellow and former Di- rector of the Defence and Strategy Program, said in an article for ADM last year: “Not all requirements are cre- ated equal and the bucket of money is not infinite.” Prior to the decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, there was an argument that Australia was over-investing in land power. Post-AUKUS, that argument has only be- come louder. ■
But at the same time, a force as small as the ADF cannot be completely generalist – in recognition of the limits of Australian power, it must specialise to Australian require- ments. At present, the most pressing of those requirements is to increase deterrence in the archipelagos of the Indo- Pacific. Our strategic reality is inescapable.
BEYOND NORTHERN AUSTRALIA
Closer to home, the ADF must also deter China from es- tablishing a military foothold in the South Pacific and be prepared to respond to humanitarian/failed state scenarios.
The riots in the Solomon Islands in late November 2021 are a good example of the kind of contingencies that may require ADF involvement. Should a failed state emerge on Australia’s doorstep, it is likely the government will deploy an Australian taskforce, partially to pre-empt the arrival of Chinese so-called ‘peacekeepers’.
Short of another Middle East contingency, this means
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