Page 139 - Australian Defence Magazine November 2021
P. 139

                    NOVEMBER 2021 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
RAAF 100 139
 THE RAAF is set to contend with significant changes to tech- nology over the coming decades. The advent of hypersonic flight and the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and ma- chine learning will force changes to the RAAF’s concept of operations and to its own culture. It will find some of these changes easier to adapt to than others.
I spoke to Andrew Davies, an ASPI Senior Fellow and former Director of the Defence and Strategy Program, about what the RAAF’s future might look like.
“There’s a couple of big questions,” Davies said. “First, what is the impact of new long-range strike capability, in- cluding hypersonic weapons? Second, what’s the role of uncrewed aircraft in the future and what does that do to our force structure?”
The impact of long-range strike is perhaps the most pressing. The speed and range of latest-generation missile
systems has increased the vulnerability of northern bases. The response, according to Davies, should be a combina- tion of defensive and offensive measures.
“Hardening and greater resilience is at a minimum what’s required,” Davies said. “There’s also a need for di- versification – more operating areas, more runways, more hardened facilities.
“The other alternative is thinking about response-in- kind. We could be looking at our own long-range strike mis- sile systems. You don’t need a crewed aircraft to do that.”
That answer hints at a deeper question. As technologi- cal advances like long-range strike erode the security of airfields in northern Australia over the coming decades, perhaps it is worth revisiting the core purpose of airpower: what it needs to achieve, and how.
“Airpower is a remedy for sea power,” Davies said. “An adversary’s control of the sea can be made marginal by a decent maritime strike capability. So the future of RAAF may be increasingly counter-maritime – and in fact it is already with the stand-off weapons on the Super Hornets and the P-8A Poseidons.
“Yet the fact that the F-35 doesn’t yet have a dedicated anti-ship missile tells you something about our priori- ties. To some extent that was due to slippage in develop- ment, and a suitable weapon is now in test, but it remains a significant shortfall in a region where maritime power is moving ahead in leaps and bounds. Our ability to do something about that has to
   keep pace.”
For Davies, the purpose of
this counter-maritime prior- ity for RAAF within Austra- lia’s larger strategic picture is to prevent an adversary from reaching south.
“WE COULD BE LOOKING AT OUR OWN LONG- RANGE STRIKE MISSILE SYSTEMS. YOU DON’T NEED A CREWED AIRCRAFT TO DO THAT”
 “As north Asia becomes
more dangerous, raising
the cost of hostile action
against Australia to the
point where the costs outweigh benefits, is an attrac- tive strategy,” he said.
  Is this just a new version of the 1987 Defence of Aus- tralia policy set out in that year’s White Paper, which has long been criticised for depriving the ADF of the capabilities required to shape the geopolitical picture overseas?
“I don’t think so,” Davies replied. “Continental defence lets the adversary get a bit too close. This is oceanic defence. The conflict we’re worried about in the western Pacific is the US and China. So the question becomes, is it possible for Austra- lian airpower to tip the balance?
“As Chinese power increases and US power declines, there will be a short window where Australia’s contribution will make a difference. But it will be a short period.
LEFT: The potential advantages offered by a mix of crewed and uncrewed platforms may address the RAAF’s numerical disadvantage.
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