Page 23 - Microeconomics, Fourth Edition

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CONTENTS xxi
11.3 Comparative Statics for Monopolists 458 11.9 Applying the Inverse Elasticity Rule for a
Shifts in Market Demand 458 Monopsonist 478
Shifts in Marginal Cost 461
11.4 Monopoly with Multiple Plants CHAPTER 12 Capturing Surplus 485
and Markets 463 Why Did Your Ticket Cost So Much Less Than Mine?
Output Choice with Two Plants 463
12.1 Capturing Surplus 487
Output Choice with Two Markets 465
Profit Maximization by a Cartel 466 12.2 First-Degree Price Discrimination: Making the
Most from Each Consumer 490
11.5 The Welfare Economics of Monopoly 469
The Monopoly Equilibrium Differs from the Perfectly 12.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination:
Competitive Equilibrium 469 Quantity Discounts 495
Monopoly Deadweight Loss 471 Block Pricing 495
Rent-Seeking Activities 471 Subscription and Usage Charges 498
11.6 Why Do Monopoly Markets Exist? 471 12.4 Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Different
Natural Monopoly 472 Prices for Different Market Segments 501
Barriers to Entry 473 Two Different Segments, Two Different Prices 501
Screening 504
11.7 Monopsony 475
Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Capacity
The Monopsonist’s Profit-Maximization Condition 475
Constraints 506
An Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule for Monopsony 477
Implementing the Scheme of Price Discrimination:
Monopsony Deadweight Loss 478
Building “Fences” 508
LEARNING-BY-DOING EXERCISES
12.5 Tying (Tie-In Sales) 512
11.1 Marginal and Average Revenue for a Linear Demand
Bundling 513
Curve 447
Mixed Bundling 515
11.2 Applying the Monopolist’s Profit-Maximization
12.6 Advertising 518
Condition 449
11.3 Computing the Optimal Monopoly Price for a LEARNING-BY-DOING EXERCISES
Constant Elasticity Demand Curve 453 12.1 Capturing Surplus: Uniform Pricing versus
11.4 Computing the Optimal Monopoly Price for a Linear First-Degree Price Discrimination 492
Demand Curve 454 12.2 Where Is the Marginal Revenue Curve with
11.5 Computing the Optimal Price Using the Monopoly First-Degree Price Discrimination? 493
Midpoint Rule 460 12.3 Increasing Profits with a Block Tariff 497
11.6 Determining the Optimal Output, Price, and Division 12.4 Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Railroad
of Production for a Multiplant Monopolist 465 Transport 503
11.7 Determining the Optimal Output and Price for a 12.5 Third-Degree Price Discrimination for Airline Tickets 505
Monopolist Serving Two Markets 466 12.6 Price Discrimination Subject to Capacity Constraints 507
11.8 Applying the Monopsonist’s Profit-Maximization 12.7 Markup and Advertising-to-Sales Ratio 520
Condition 476

PART 6 IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR

CHAPTER 13 Market Structure and 13.3 Dominant Firm Markets 546
Competition 528 13.4 Oligopoly with Horizontally Differentiated
Products 549
Is Competition Always the Same? If Not, Why Not?
What Is Product Differentiation? 549
13.1 Describing and Measuring Market Bertrand Price Competition with Horizontally
Structure 530 Differentiated Products 553
13.2 Oligopoly with Homogeneous Products 533 13.5 Monopolistic Competition 558
The Cournot Model of Oligopoly 533 Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium in Monopolistically
The Bertrand Model of Oligopoly 541 Competitive Markets 558
Why Are the Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Price Elasticity of Demand, Margins, and Number of Firms
Different? 543 in the Market 560
The Stackelberg Model of Oligopoly 544 Do Prices Fall When More Firms Enter? 560