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COMPETITION LAW IN BRAZIL: 2018 OVERVIEW                                                     29




                               For several years, CADE’s Superintendence investigated the conduct and
              finally concluded that the lawsuits did not constitute a sham litigation strategy. Based on the
              Tribunal’s decision on the ANFAPE case (discussed above), the Superintendence also dismissed
              the SO claim that enforcers should weigh pros and cons of the lawful exercise of an IPR.
                               CADE’s Tribunal released the final administrative decision in the second
              semester of 2018. Relying on US precedents, the Tribunal unanimously held that there was
              no sham litigation conduct under the PRE, POSCO and fraud litigation/misrepresentation
              tests, nor any kind of misuse of IP rights. The Tribunal recognized that Lundbeck merely
              presented to the courts a legitimate dispute of legal interpretation regarding the protection of
              data packages in Brazil.
                               According to the Commissioners, Lundbeck’s lawsuits are not a sham
              because the Brazilian IP statute is not clear on whether protection against unauthorized use
              should be awarded to data package of drugs. Thus, it would be possible to argue for different
              interpretations. Furthermore, Lundbeck’s claims were upheld by courts, evidencing that they
              were not baseless, but rather promoted a legitimate debate based on legal interpretation.
              Additionally, CADE found that Lundbeck did not file a series of lawsuits with the potential
              of harming competition and there was no evidence that it misrepresented facts to courts.
              Regarding the allegation of misuse of IP rights, CADE
              held that Lundbeck merely presented a legal dispute  RELYING ON US PRECEDENTS,
              to courts to establish whether it had IP rights over its  THE TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY
              data package. Therefore, no misuse of IP rights with  HELD THAT THERE WAS NO
              anticompetitive effects could be found.          SHAM LITIGATION CONDUCT
                               With this decision, CADE’s Tribunal  UNDER THE PRE, POSCO
              showed a lot of maturity in handling sham litigation  AND FRAUD LITIGATION/
              accusations involving the enforcement of IPRs. Like in  MISREPRESENTATION TESTS,
              the Anfape case, CADE demonstrated self-restraint and  NOR ANY KIND OF MISUSE
              appropriately balanced the limits of antitrust law with  OF IP RIGHTS. THE TRIBUNAL
              regards to the enforcement of IPRs. This case consolidates  RECOGNIZED THAT LUNDBECK
              the view that IPRs and antitrust law are best viewed as  MERELY PRESENTED TO
              complementary regimes that share the goal of maximizing  THE COURTS A LEGITIMATE
              social welfare and that it is against the basic principles  DISPUTE OF LEGAL
              of antitrust law to apply the rule of reason to redefine  INTERPRETATION REGARDING
              the balance set by the legislature in determining the right  THE PROTECTION OF DATA
              amount of IP protection.                         PACKAGES IN BRAZIL.




                                                               10  In the Administrative Process No. 08012.011508/2007-91, Eli Lilly was
                                                               fined in 2015 for allegedly having practiced the following conducts: (i)
                                                               patent filing for a component it was aware could not be patented; (ii) attempt
                                                               to broaden the initial scope of the patent filing after the Brazilian PTO’s
                                                               negative decision; (iii) contradictory claims before the Brazilian PTO and the
                                                               Courts; (iv) request for Exclusive Market Rights after the 5-year period since
                                                               the drug commercialization approval; (v) repeated lawsuits.
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