Page 252 - American Stories, A History of the United States
P. 252

The Gibbons v. Ogden decision of 1824 bolstered Congress’s power to regulate   Gibbons v. ogden  In this
                    interstate commerce. A competing ferry service operating between New York and New   1824 case, the Supreme court   9.1
                    Jersey challenged a steamboat monopoly granted by the state of New York. The Court   expanded the power of the federal
                                                                                               government to regulate interstate
                    declared the New York grant unconstitutional because it amounted to state interfer-  commerce.
                    ence with Congress’s exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce. The Court’s                      9.2
                    ruling went a long way toward freeing private interests engaged in furthering the trans-
                    portation revolution from state interference.
                       This case showed the dual effect of Marshall’s decision making. It broadened the                    9.3
                    power of the federal government at the expense of the states and encouraged the growth
                    of a national market economy. The Court’s actions provide the clearest and most con-  Quick Check
                    sistent example of the main nationalistic trends of the period—the acknowledgment of   What did John Marshall believe the
                    the federal government’s role in promoting a powerful and prosperous America and   Supreme Court’s role should be, and
                    the rise of a nationwide capitalist economy.                                  how did he help to create It?


                    Nationalism in Foreign Policy: The Monroe Doctrine
                    Foreign affairs also reflected the new spirit of nationalism. The main diplomatic chal-
                    lenge facing Monroe after his reelection in 1820 was how to respond to the successful
                    revolt of most of Spain’s and Portugal’s Latin American colonies after the Napole-
                    onic wars. In Congress, Henry Clay called for immediate recognition of the new states.
                    In doing so, he expressed the belief of many Americans that their neighbors to the
                    south were simply following the example of the United States in its own struggle for
                    independence.
                       Before 1822, the administration stuck to a policy of neutrality. Monroe and Sec-
                    retary of State Adams feared that recognizing the revolutionary governments would
                    antagonize Spain and impede negotiations to acquire Florida. But pressure for recog-
                    nition grew in Congress; in 1821, the House of Representatives, responding to Clay’s
                    impassioned oratory, passed a resolution of sympathy for Latin American revolu-
                    tionaries and made it clear that the president would have the support of Congress
                    if and when he decided to accord recognition. After the Adams–Onís Treaty ceding
                    Florida to the United States had been formally ratified in 1821, Monroe agreed to
                    recognition and diplomatic ties with the Latin American states. The United States
                    recognized Mexico and Colombia in 1822, Chile and Argentina in 1823, Brazil (which
                    had separated from Portugal) and the Federation of Central American States in 1824,
                    and Peru in 1826.
                       Recognizing the Latin American states put the United States on a possible collision
                    course with the major European powers. Austria, Russia, and Prussia were committed
                    to rolling back the tides of liberalism, self-government, and national self-determina-
                    tion that had arisen during the French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath. After
                    Napoleon’s first defeat in 1814, the monarchs of Europe had joined in a “Grand Alli-
                    ance” to protect “legitimate” authoritarian governments from democratic challenges.
                    Great Britain was originally a member of this concert of nations but withdrew when
                    its own interests conflicted with those of the other members. In 1822, the remaining
                    alliance members, joined now by the restored French monarchy, authorized France to
                    invade Spain and restore a Bourbon regime that might be disposed to reconquer the
                    empire. This prospect alarmed both Great Britain and the United States.
                       Particularly troubling to American policymakers was the role of Czar Alexander I
                    of Russia. Not only was the czar an outspoken and active opponent of Latin American
                    independence, but he was attempting to extend Russian claims on the Pacific coast of
                    North America south to the 51st parallel—into the Oregon Country, which the United
                    States wanted for itself.
                       The threat from the Grand Alliance pointed to a need for American cooperation
                    with Great Britain, which had its own reasons for wanting to prevent a restoration of
                    Spanish, Portuguese, or French power in the New World. Independent nations offered
                    better and more open markets for British manufactured goods than the colonies of


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