Page 52 - KFTL Report

Boom Hoist Ropes
AC units failing
Floodlights
Elevators
Rust Control
Boom Anti-Collision
CMS/ Drives/ PLCs
Festoons
Manpower
#1 QCs
#2 QCs
#3 QCs
#4 QCs
#5 QCs West
#6 QCs
#7 QCs
#8 QCs
Berth
Boom hoist ropes breaking leading to catostrophic boom collapse
Overheating and operational failures of Drives - Trolley cutting out at speed - potential electrical fire hazard.
Falling lights and components
Operational delays on vessel due to high levels of elevator problems - Risk of falling personnel
Signficant corrosion taken place - Electrical cabinets not sealed - Gantry brakes failing
Boom anti-collision not working on many QC's
Delays due to lengthy troubleshooting times - Obsolete components - systems - hardwire bypasses uncontrolled and in multiple areas of cranes
Falling parts from festoon system
Manpower shortage in appropriate areas - not fulfilling maintenance demands in port
Uncontrolled descent and/ or collapse and falling of boom
Significant drive reliability problems - Operator injuries (current today) due to drives tripping at speed - Fire potential on Drives in electrical room.
Potential injury and/ or fatality from falling floodlight parts to the ground.
Delays in operator starting work on ship - increased cost of operators - Doors open when out of station!
Water ingress allowing contact with electrical circuits - A number of gantry brakes not functioning leaving cranes vulnerable to an uncontrolled movement by wind.
Potential collision with vessel structures
Uncontrolled system failures due to bypassiing culture. Service interuptions increasing and increasing customer disatisfaction. No documentation of bypassing activities.
Potential injury and/ or fatality from falling festoon parts to the ground.
Service failures will continue to increase - Potential of safety related event happening increasing with this maintenance culture.
4
Impact description happening today
at KFTL. Operators have been
treated for strain injuries sustained 5 due to sudden stopping of trolley at
full speed.
Evidence sighted, showing lights/ 4 parts of lights falling to the ground
Evident today due to high level of
elevator technical failures - and
operator delays on vessel - 5 additional operators to man QCs etc -
Evidence of doors opening when
elevator out of station!
Evidence of electrical conduit and
junction boxes corroded through - 4 Evidence of gantry brakes failed.
Evdidence of failed anti-collision
systems. Recently recorded event of
QC boom hitting radar/ bridge on 4 vessel causing significant vessel
scheduling delays and property
damage
Evidence of multiple hardwired
bypasses. Known boom event
occurred due to uncontrolled 5 bypassing of circuits. Delays on
vessel longer than need be.
Evidence sighted, showing festoon 4 parts falling to the ground
ERT (breakdown team) utilising
maintenance people during peak
demands - causing some tasks to be 4 delayed and/ or not completed
4 Potential Fatality
Personnel injury requiring 3 treatment
4 Potential fatality
4 Potential fatality
Potential loss of crane - 4 and/ or serious injury/
fatality
2,000,000
3 Potential personnel injury
(maybe even fatality)
Potential catastrophic 4 event/ Serious injury/
Fatality
4 Potential fatality
3 Injury
Replace boom hoist ropes - thoroughly inspect remaining ones
Replace AC units - Ensure crrect specification - Ensure AC maintenance practices robust - Address Drive/ PLC issues
Implement corrective repair program dealing with all crane lighting issues.
Implement corrective repair program dealing with all crane elevator issues. Replace obsolete elevators
Implement corrective repair program dealing with all corroded items. Replace failed gantry brakes. Amend and implement improved maintenance practices to address corrosion on West berth.
Replace all boom anti-collision systems with appropriate quality solutions.
Implement program to upgrade and replace Drives, Communications BUS, PLC, Local CMS and R-CMS
Implement corrective repair program dealing with all crane festoon issues.
Impelement appropriate organisation. Develop robust maintenance strategy that will move KFTL from current ERT focus to proactive focus. Address parts and procurement issues. Develop proper
KFTL DUE DILIGENCE – Kingston, Jamaica
13.1.5 Risk Workshop Outcome – Assumptions Reached:
Below is the output from the risk workshop held with the various members of the engineering team.
The purpose is, through the workshop sessions and cross functional teams, to provide an objective picture related to various impact risks to KFTL, so that informed investment and activity decisions can be made to support any mitigating circumstances identified to manage, reduce and/or eliminate the risks.
Calculations and Assumptions to Support KFTL Risk Identification & Assessment - March 2018
Equipment / Concerns
Risk ID
Risk Area
Description
Impact description
Assumption
Likelihood
Consequence
Retained Risk (USD)
Action
Current Risk Level
Summarize in key word the concern
sequential ID number
Location
Explain briefly the risk
Explain what will happen if nothing is done to address the risk
Itemize what we know about the risk
Quantify by your best estimate the likelihood of the impact happening if nothing is done
What will be the consequence to KFTL
is it (a) USD cost, (b)
fatality or (c) other - that’s driving the risk?
What do you need to do now!
YELLOW
RED
RED
RED
Red
Red
Amber
Red
Red
Amber
Maintenance #9 Section
TRENT ASSOCIATES
52