Page 747 - Atlas of Creation Volume 3

Harun Yahya

are nothing but a pack of idiosyncratic genes. We are nothing but a pack of adaptations sculpted by natural
selection. We are nothing but a pack of computational devices dedicated to different tasks. We are nothing but
a pack of sexual neuroses. These proclamations, like Crick's, are all defensible, and they are all inade-

quate. 30
Of course, these explanations are all inadequate and they are definitely not logical. Any fanatic mate-
rialist is in fact aware of this truth. Not surprisingly, Thomas Huxley, the foremost advocate of Darwin

also stated that consciousness cannot be explained by the interaction of neurons: "How it is that any-
thing so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is
just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his lamp." 31

From Huxley's time until the present, the failure to explain human consciousness through neurons
hasn't changed. However, this is not because of the inadequacy of science regarding this issue. In con-
trast, especially towards the end of the 20th century, there have been many developments in the field of
neurology with many mysteries being solved. However, these findings have showed that human con-
sciousness can never be reduced to matter and the reality lies beyond the material. One of the leading

Darwinist-materialist writers in Germany, Hoimar Von Ditfurth, also confesses the fact that the currently
adopted methods cannot describe human consciousness:

With our present research in natural history and genetic development, it is obvious that we will not be
able to give an answer to what consciousness, spirit, intelligence and feelings are. That is because psychic-

consciousness level is the highest level that evolution has arrived, at least in this world. Therefore, although
we are able to look at the other stages and phases of evolution from the outside, by rising above them, again
by the help of our consciousness, we are unable to approach consciousness (or spirit) itself in a similar way.
That is because no level higher than consciousness is available to us. 32

American philosopher and doctor of mathematics, William A. Dembski, states in his article,
"Converting Matter into Mind", that the bio-chemical functioning of neurons in the human brain and

which mental functions it involves have been understood, although qualities such as decision making,
wishing, or reasoning cannot be "reduced to matter". Dembski also points out that specialists on con-
sciousness have realized the error of reductionism;

…Cognitive scientists abandon hope of understanding this higher level through the lower neurological
level. …Thus while the commitment to materialism persists, the hope of explaining human intelligence at the

neural level, which for the materialist is the logical level, is not a serious consideration. 33

It is impossible to describe consciousness with a materialist worldview, regardless of the extent of
scientific development. As details of the brain surface, it becomes clearer that the mind is irreducible to
matter. Materialists must put aside their prejudices and think deeper and research further if they are to
understand the concept of human consciousness, as it is impossible to define the real meaning of con-

sciousness through matter. Consciousness is a function of the soul that is given to man by God.

Questions For Materialists

It is totally illogical to state that thoughts, judgments, decision mechanisms, or feelings (such as hap-
piness, excitement, and disappointment) are merely the results of the interaction of neurons in the brain
of a human being. Materialists who consider this issue more deeply are aware of this truth. The famous

materialist, Karl Lashley, made the following comment towards the end of his career, even though he had
defended the idea for years that human consciousness could be reduced to matter:

Whether the mind-body relation is regarded as a genuine metaphysical issue or a systematized delusion, it re-
mains a problem for the psychologist (and for the neurologist when he deals with human problems) as it is
not for the physicist. . . . How can the brain, as a physico-chemical system, perceive or know anything; or

develop the delusion that it does so? 34

Adnan Oktar 745