Page 18 - John Hundley 2013
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Noting that a name search of Jefferson County land records would have
        revealed the existence of Peoples’ second loan and that Banterra offered no
        evidence  that  that  loan  could  not  have  been  discovered  upon  reasonable
        investigation,  the  court  rejected  arguments  that  that  siding  with  Peoples
        would impose a duty of endless investigation stretching to the land records of
        other  states.    “[T]he  law  requires  reasonable  investigation,  not  endless
        investigation,” the court said.  “[W]here to draw that line will be a question
        of fact for the trier of fact” in cases where allegedly reasonable inquiry has been made.

            The  court  also  rejected  arguments  that  Peoples’  mortgage  (a  form  LaserPro  document)  had
        “inherent contradictions and ambiguities” which did not create a duty of inquiry in the first place, an
        argument which had led the District Court to award judgment to Banterra.   Peoples Nationals [sic]
        Bank, N.A. v. Jones, 482 B.R. 257 (S.D. Ill. 2012).  In that regard, the  Seventh Circuit specifically
        ruled that a maximum lien clause equal in amount to the original note did not create an implication
        that only the original note was covered by the mortgage.  “The mortgage is not susceptible of two
        meanings,” it said in reversing the District Court judgment.

            By  relying  on  the  doctrine  of  inquiry  notice,  the  court  avoided  deciding  whether  Peoples’
        mortgage was insufficient to impart record notice of the second loan under § 11 of the Illinois
        Conveyances Act (765 ILCS 5/11).  The District Court had ruled that because Peoples’ mortgage
        had failed to state the maturity date, interest rate and other terms of the cross-collateralized loan, it
        was insufficient to give record notice to third parties under that act.  Noting that several Illinois courts
        have appeared to rule that the elements set forth in § 11 are mandatory for record notice purposes,
        but that the text of § 11 and a recent statutory amendment (P.A. 97-1164 § 20) suggest § 11 is only
        permissive, the court said it saw “no need to enter this fray.”

            In so ruling, the panel likely was cognizant that two other appeals on the
        Seventh  Circuit’s  docket  more  directly  raised  the  §  11  issue  and  had  been
        stayed pending resolution of Peoples v. Banterra.  See Richardson v. Gifford State
        Bank, No. 13-1518, and Bruegge v. Farmers State Bank of Hoffman, No. 13-1277.
        In both, lower courts have held that the language of § 11 is permissive.  See In re
        Crane, 487 B.R. 906 (C.D. Ill. 2013); In re Klasi Properties, LLC, 2013 WL 211111
        (Bankr.  S.D.  Ill.  2013).    See  also  Sharp  Thinking  No.  87  (April 2013);  In  re  HIE
        Effingham,  LLC,  __  B.R.  __,  2013  WL  1334282  (Bankr.  S.D.  Ill.  2013)  (similar;
        appeal pending  before  the  U.S.  District  Court  for the  Southern  District  of  Illinois
        (WBCMT 2007 C-33 Mid-America Lodging v. Bruegge, No. 13-cv-00439-WDS)).

            Two other observations also might be offered concerning Peoples v. Banterra.

            First,  the  ruling  is  of  doubtful  precedent  in  non-commercial  cases  –  but  cross-collateralization
        clauses are rare in consumer mortgages anyway.

            Second, the court enforced the cross-collateralization clause notwithstanding a provision that the
        cross-collateralized debt need not be related to the purpose of the original note.  Whether the court
        rejected cases which have said the original and cross-collateralized debts must be similar in purpose,
        or whether the court accepted Peoples’ arguments that in the instant case they were, is unclear.

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