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The reference to inconsistent positions was an apparent reference to the requirement in the law of
        malpractice that a plaintiff generally has to prove “the case within the case”  – in the case at bar, that
        resistance to the first suit would have prevented a judgment from being obtained against the company.
        See generally Sharp Thinking No. 35 (July 2010).

             The  court  rejected  an  argument  that  judicial  estoppel  should  not  be  applied  because  it  would  bar
        innocent  third-party  creditors  from  sharing  in  the  recovery.    Noting  that  there  were  some  additional
        creditors who would share in a recovery by the bankruptcy trustee, the court countered that that trustee
        was prepared to terminate the bankruptcy as a no-asset estate until  the default judgment creditor had
        stepped forward and financed the malpractice suit, so the additional creditors would not be prejudiced.

             The  Seventh  Circuit  expressly  treated  as  only  “guidelines”  the  traditional  tests  of  judicial
        estoppel – whether the party's later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position; whether the
        party succeeded in persuading a court to accept its position, so that an inconsistent position in the later
        proceeding would create a perception that one of the courts was misled; and whether the party seeking to
        assert the inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the
        opponent.    The  court  appeared  to  apply  only  federal  law,  and  whether  its  approach  would  impact  the
        arguably more stringent requirements when Illinois state law applies is unclear.

             The  significance  of  this  last  point  was  brought  into  sharp  relief  recently  by  Holland  v.
        Schwan's  Home  Serv.,  Inc.,  2013  IL  App  (5th)  110560.    There  the  defendant  attempted  to  invoke
        judicial estoppel because the plaintiff had not disclosed his wrongful discharge claim in his Chapter 13
        bankruptcy.  However, that claim had not arisen when the bankruptcy had been filed, and the debtor had
        not filed any amended schedules or other papers failing to disclose it after it did arise.

             “Holland's failure to schedule his post-petition claim against Schwan's as an asset of the bankruptcy
        estate does not constitute an inconsistent position given under oath,” the court said.  “[A]lthough he did
        not properly disclose the retaliatory discharge claim, he did not take two inconsistent positions under oath.
        . . . '[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel is ground[ed] in the sanctity of the oath.'”

             In addition, the court said it would not apply judicial estoppel because the failure to disclose in the
        bankruptcy court  was “inadvertent” and because the  debtor  had not  gained  an  advantage  by the non-
        disclosure (the bankruptcy had been dismissed for failure to make required payments under the confirmed
        plan).  The court treated the application of judicial estoppel as one of discretion and distinguished Berge v.
                          Mader,  2011  IL  App  (1st)  103778  (see  Sharp  Thinking  No.  57  (Feb.  2012))  on  the
                          grounds that that case involved the failure to disclose in the initial bankruptcy petition
                          and a discretionary application of the judicial estoppel doctrine, while Holland involved
                          review of a trial court's discretionary non-application of that doctrine.

                               Not all courts would agree with  Holland.  As there is a duty to disclose the post-
                          petition asset, some would hold that the failure to do so was the functional equivalent of
                          a false filing.  The distinction between applying and refusing to apply the doctrine seems
                          suspect, as does the attempt to limit Berge to initial schedules.
                                                                                                      John\Sharp Thinking\#97.doc



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