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the temporary program than she was required under the original mortgage and note.  Consideration
          was found in Wigod’s agreeing to open new  escrow accounts, to undergo credit counseling, and to
          provide and vouch for financial information.

             Promissory Estoppel Claim Sustained.  In the alternative, the court said
          plaintiff could rely upon a promissory estoppel theory.  “Promissory estoppel makes a
          promise binding where ‘all the other elements of a contract exist, but consideration is
          lacking,’”  it  said,  citing  Dumas  v.  Infinity  Broadcasting  Co.,  416  F.3d  671  (7th  Cir.
          2005).  In place of consideration, promissory estoppel requires detrimental reliance,
          but that was found in plaintiff’s foregoing the opportunity to use other remedies to save
          her home and in her devoting her resources to making the payments under the temporary program
          rather than attempting to sell her home or defaulting.

             Negligence, Negligent Misrepresentation Claims Rejected.  Next plaintiff argued that
          defendant  had  negligently  hired  and  supervised  its  HAMP  employees  in  an  effort  to  sabotage  the
          program.  The court found this claim barred under the “economic loss” doctrine of Illinois tort law.  In a
          potentially significant passage, the court recognized that Illinois has exceptions to the economic loss
          doctrine,  but  it  ruled  that  such  exceptions  must  stem  from  “an  extra-contractual  duty  between  the
          parties”  –  of  which  the  court  found  none  in  the  HAMP  context.    A  claim  that  defendant  had  made
          negligent misrepresentations was rejected for the same reason.

             Fraud  Claims  Sustained.    Plaintiff  also  argued  defendant  committed  fraud,  a  recognized
          exception to the  economic loss doctrine.  Noting Wigod claimed that Wells Fargo “made and broke
          promises  of  permanent  modifications  to  her  and  to  thousands  of  other  potential  class  members  as
          well,” the court said such a widespread pattern of deception could reasonably be considered a scheme
          actionable under Illinois law on promissory fraud (discussed in Sharp Thinking No. 59 (March 2012)).

             The court also sustained plaintiff’s claim under the ICFDBPA.  Noting that intent to deceive is not a
          requirement  under  this  act  (see  Sharp  Thinking  No.  19  (April  2009)),  the  court  said  Wigod  alleged
          practices which were both deceptive and unfair under that act.  It rejected an argument plaintiff suffered
          no “actual pecuniary loss” because her plan payments were less than the original mortgage required.

             Preemption Arguments Rejected.  Finally, defendant argued that plaintiff’s state-law causes
          of action were preempted by federal law.  Citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing
          Litigation, 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007), the court first rejected an argument that the federal government
                                had  intended  to  preemptively  occupy  the  entire  field  of  mortgage  lending
                                regulation.  Next  defendant  argued  that  preemption  had  to  be  found  because
                                federal regulation “conflicts” with the state causes of action.  This theory too was
                                rejected by the court.  Noting that Wigod’s claims were derived from the federal
                                program, the court ruled that allowing them to proceed “would not create state-
                                law duties for servicing home mortgages, let alone ones that ‘actually conflict’”
                                with  federal  law.    Rebuffing  defendant’s  claim  that  it  might  be  subject  to
                                inconsistent duties, the court said that “the state-law duty allegedly breached is
          imported from and delimited by federal standards established in HAMP’s program guidelines. . . . So
          long  as  state  laws  do  not  impose  substantive  duties  that  go  beyond  HAMP’s  requirements,  loan
          servicers need only comply with the federal program to avoid incurring state-law liability.”

                                                                                                   John\SharpThinking\#61.doc
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