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and that the other one was not, and all that was needed was to clarify
which of them was the son.

In maseches Yoma (83a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim
618,3) it says, “If one physician says that a patient must eat on Yom
Kippur and two say he can fast, he may not eat because a lone opinion
does not stand against an opinion shared by two.” I have heard the
question asked in the name of Rav Shlomo Tenne zt”l, that in light of
the Chasam Sofer’s comments that physicians are only believed with
reservation, how on the basis of an uncertainty can we discount the
view of the physician who says the patient needs to eat? We ought to
accept all views with equal uncertainty and in the resulting situation
of doubt the patient should eat on Yom Kippur.

I heard the following answer to this question from my father-in-
law Rav Y.S. Elyashiv zt”l: in regard to the need to eat on Yom Kippur
physicians’ opinions are generally accepted with certainty, because the
basis for their decisions are clear and apparent and in most cases the
physician can confidently determine whether or not the patient is
able to fast.

There was a case involving a pregnant woman who was bleeding
and opinion among the physicians in regard to her fasting on Yom
Kippur was divided. Since this was a question of judgment [i.e. there
was no empirical data on which to base a decision] and according
to my father-in-law zt”l, the rule that “a lone opinion does not stand
against an opinion shared by two” is inapplicable, so even if two said
that she could fast and one said she has to eat she would have to eat,
because the two base their opinion upon their assessment rather than
on objective factors, though further reflection is needed2.

Now, the Chasam Sofer (Even Ha’ezer, 17) discusses the case of a
man whose testicle was removed by physicians because it had ceased

2. See earlier, siman 221 regarding a pregnant woman suffering from a slipped
disc. The physicians disagreed as to whether given her condition, the pregnancy
posed danger to her life and ought to be terminated. See our discussion there of
the principle ‘A lone opinion does not stand against an opinion shared by two’
and our comments ibid. Note 2.

Reliability of Medical Testing for Paternity 2 111