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to steal another thousand pounds. Even though he always intended
to return them, stealing with the intent of returning the stolen item
is also forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 348:1). [2] He
extorted the bank’s cancellation of a thousand pounds by lying. Had
the bank known that the clerk had stolen an additional thousand in
order to return them – supposedly on behalf of his family who in fact
had made no effort whatsoever to return the debt – they certainly
wouldn’t have agreed to forego a thousand pounds. On the other
hand though, perhaps one can justify the lawyer’s actions by arguing
that this was a situation of piku’ach nefesh which sets aside all Torah
prohibitions, including those of lying and stealing.

Dr. Assaf

ɳ Response

In order to discuss these two cases, three points require consideration
and clarification:

1. Is the situation of a person contemplating suicide considered
piku’ach nefesh? It seems logical that piku’ach nefesh is only relevant
either when non-Jews want to kill a Jew and saving him will involve
violating Torah prohibitions, or if illness threatens a patient’s life and
curing him involves violating prohibitions. However, if no one is forc-
ing a person to violate a prohibition but he wants to commit suicide
of his own volition, this is not a situation of piku’ach nefesh.

2. Are stealing and robbery allowed in order to avoid piku’ach
nefesh?

3. Should criminals be protected and saved from punishment?
Both the first and the last points: 1. whether an intended suicide is
considered piku’ach nefesh and 2. whether criminals should be pro-
tected -- are also relevant to the first question: was the psychiatrist
obligated to issue the false document that the woman who threat-
ened to kill herself was demanding?
We shall start by considering the first point – is a threatened
suicide considered piku’ach nefesh?

Lying to Prevent Suicide 2 375