Page 124 - Pep Guardiola: Another Way of Winning: The Biography

3-1: a formation that could convert into 4-4-1-1. ‘Are you sure?’ Pep had to ask till he was
convinced. Barcelona came out with their classical 4-3-3.

The report from his friend was spot-on.
In the first ten minutes, Manchester United applied lots of pressure and intensity with
man-to-man marking in midfield. Rooney stuck close to Busquets to prevent Barcelona
building from the back, through him. Giggs was all over Xavi. Barcelona struggled as they
couldn’t find superiority in any part of the pitch and the game was in the hands of United.

After ten minutes, the first of two key moves of that final took place.
Xavi dropped a little deeper, to receive the ball in line with where Busquets would
normally start. It meant that Barcelona effectively switched to a 4-2-3-1. United didn’t feel

brave enough to send any player to mark Xavi that high upfield – and if they did, they
reacted too late. It enabled Xavi to see more of the ball, in space – allowing him to play
with his head up, under little pressure, pick his passes and start dictating the game from
deep. It was a good move; but it did mean that Barcelona’s superiority was taking place a
little deeper than they might have wished.

And then another tactical move changed everything.
Messi started to see more of the ball in midfield. He moved from his position higher up, in
between the lines, to a midfield area where neither Vidić nor Ferdinand followed for fear of

straying too far from their centre-back positions.
It effectively meant that the midfield was shaping up as Busquets, Xavi, Iniesta and Messi
against Rooney, Carrick and Giggs.
From that moment on, Barcelona had control of the game. They scored in the twenty-

seventh minute to make it 1-0. Rooney, however, pulled United level five minutes later and
i n the following few minutes Barcelona appeared to be reeling from the sucker punch.
However, they soon regained composure and control.
The Catalan team was brave in their pressing high upfield, too. One passage of play

highlights how high Barcelona pressed: United rushed twelve passes together with none of
them crossing the halfway line, so suffocated were they by the pressure of the Barcelona
players in their own half.

Half-time:

The United players didn’t quite stick to the plan and received a dressing down from their
backroom staff. Instructions were forgotten: like failing to get the ball into the Barcelona box
from deadball situations. One player came in for special criticism from Ferguson’s

assistants: Wayne Rooney, who failed to track Busquets as the manager had instructed
him. Yet, as a sign of what some members of the United staff took as a reluctant
acceptance of Barcelona’s superiority, Sir Alex was uncharacteristically subdued.

Second half:

Manchester United sporadically pressed high up, with Chicharito and Rooney running after
the ball when it was passed back to Valdés, but the second line (Giggs, Carrick) didn’t
follow up the pressure. So Barcelona were building from the back quite easily and found

Busquets often, who would then start the attack.