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Minister the ‘decision to accept the Soviet offer was understandable if

regrettable’. 404

The sale of Soviet arms to Egypt opened the possibility of financial aid. In the

summer of 1955 the Egyptian regime announced a plan to build an ambitious

project known as the Aswan High Dam. 405 Trevelyan saw the project to ‘be the focal

point of Egyptian development over the next twenty years’. It aimed to develop and

irrigate more land to keep pace with Egypt’s growing population. 406 The project

was also designed to ‘develop hydro-electricity’. 407 It was hoped that the World

Bank would finance most of the project with the balance coming from the US and

Britain. 408 Dulles received information from Egypt that the Soviets might follow-up

their arms deal by offering economic aid that included finance for the dam. 409

Commenting on that prospect Shuckburgh saw Nasser to be totally ‘unreliable’ and

accused him of ‘consciously handing over his country to Communism’. 410 The whole

High Dam demarche would add to the conflict between Nasser and Britain later in

1956 in another step towards the eventual Suez debacle.

In Bahrain new confidential minutes on 3 October forwarded to the Resident

by an unnamed official described Al-Bakir’s account of the latest developments

between the HEC and the Administration. Al-Bakir informed the official that a

404 BDEEP, Series B, Part III, vol. 4, ‘Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East’ 1953-1956. Doc. 608:
CAB 128/29, CM 36 (55)1, ‘Middle East’: Cabinet conclusions on responding to Soviet policy in the
Middle East, 20 October 1955.
405 For more information on the High Aswan Dam project see T. Little, High Dam at Aswan
(Fakenham: 1965).
406 Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution, 49.
407 Eden, Full Circle, 375.
408 Nutting, Nasser, 131.
409 BDEEP, Series B, Part III, vol. 4, ‘Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East’ 1953-1956. Doc. 602:
FO 371/113676, [Problems raised by the Egyptian purchase of Soviet arms]: FO record of a
conversation in the State Department between British and US representatives, 3 October 1955.
410 Descent to Suez, 28 November 1955, 305.

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