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extremist elements from taking control of the situation, nor on influencing society as

a whole. On the contrary these elements had withdrawn from the political scene

altogether. When invited by the Government to participate in its committees and

councils they turned such offers down and did not voice their opinion on current

events, even to the Ruler. However they were known to be paying ‘contributions to

NUC funds for fear of having their windows broken, rather than as an investment in

political security’. 612

Britain’s Ambassador to Iran, Sir Roger Stevens, warned the FO that the

cohesiveness of the Baghdad Pact was at stake, undermined by the conflict in

Bahrain. He referred to an unspecified Iranian newspaper that had reported that

Britain sought Iraqi aid in the form of armed troops to be stationed in Bahrain. The

publication urged Iraqis not to accept Britain’s request and called for the Bahraini

issue to be raised at the upcoming Baghdad Pact Council Meeting. 613 The Iranians, it

seemed, were more concerned about the conflict in Bahrain (due to their claim of

sovereignty over the islands) than they were in supporting the coalition’s own

interests. 614

Al-Watan of 28 March announced that the Government’s Board of Enquiry

had launched its first in a series of public investigations into the events that had

unfolded in Bahrain between 2 to 16 March. Two of the earliest citizens to come

forward with testimony (in particular about the Lloyd car-stoning incident) were

Abdulla Al-Wazzan and Mohammed Al-Shirawi. According to the newspaper a total

612 TNA, FO 371/120545, Burrows to FO, 26 March 1956.
613 TNA, FO 371/120545, Roger Stevens to FO, 30 March 1956.
614 For information on the alleged Iranian claim of Bahrain see J.B. Kelly, ‘The Persian Claim in
Bahrain’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 33.1 (1957), 51-70.

© Hamad E. Abdulla 197