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of past appeasers. Trevelyan viewed that ‘appeasement of a dictator was the most

serious danger to reputation and career’. 758

In the British Cabinet’s meeting following Nasser’s nationalisation held on 27

July, Eden informed the Cabinet that he had made it clear to the US’s Charge

d’Affaires and the French Ambassador that

any failure on the part of the Western Powers to take the necessary
steps to regain control over the Canal would have disastrous
consequences for the economic life of the Western Powers for their
standing and influence in the Middle East.

More information on the economic importance of the Canal was presented to the

Cabinet detailing that sixty million tons of oil from the Arabian Gulf region (of a total

of seventy million tons) passed through the Canal en route to Western Europe.

Furthermore any threat to the Canal would also obstruct Britain’s trade routes to

the East. 759 Britain’s first step at retaliating was its freeze of Egypt’s sterling

balances, estimated to be around £110 million. 760 The crisis would be the start of

frantic international diplomatic efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution.

Following up on the desire to reshuffle Bahrain’s Administration Gault met

with the Ruler on 5 August. The Sheikh informed the Agent that he had agreed to

Belgrave’s retirement but that he did not envision that he would leave Bahrain

immediately. The Agent reminded the Ruler that it was arranged for Smith to take

over the Adviser’s duties as Secretary to the Bahraini Government upon his

expected return in October and that it would not be possible for both to carry out

758 Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution, 7.
759 TNA, CAB 128/30, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister’s Room,
House of Commons, 27 July1956.
760 FRUS, vol. XVI, ‘Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956’. Doc. 40: Special National Intelligence
Estimate: Nasser and the Middle East Situation, 31 July 1956.

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