Page 283 - Begrave Thesis_Neat

No disturbances were recorded in Bahrain on 31 October. Burrows, unaware

of the prearrangement between Britain, France, and Israel, feared that a reaction

might erupt in Bahrain as a result of Britain’s probable announcement to re-occupy

strategic posts in the Suez Canal Zone or the insistence that both the Egyptians and

Israelis should withdraw from the area. Burrows made the point that, should events

call for British military intervention (boots on the Egyptian ground), it would be

interpreted in Bahrain that Britain was taking the Israeli side of the conflict. His

advice (from his role in Bahrain) was that Britain should broker a ceasefire and

force Israel to withdraw. 823 As the day progressed Burrows realised that Bahrainis

firmly believed that both Britain and France had instigated the Israeli attack in

order to give itself a casus belli and a bona fide raison d’etre to take over the Canal. 824

The Bahrain Government Annual Report noted that a small demonstration by

schoolboys and girls took place on 31 October led by Al-Bakir’s son. 825

As anticipated, Nasser rejected the Anglo-French ultimatum. 826 The bombing

of Egyptian targets by British and French aircrafts followed. The following day, 1

November, a reaction in Bahrain started to take shape, as Belgrave noted in his

diary. Problems started with a demonstration by local schoolboys which escalated

in Muharraq as demonstrators blocked roads, stoned cars, and attacked

government-owned flats. 827

823 TNA, FO 1016/478, Despatch 956, Burrows to FO, 31 October 1956.
824 TNA, FO 1016/478, Despatch 961, Burrows to FO, 31 October 1956.
825 ‘Government of Bahrain: Annual Report for Year 1956’, 1-111 (7).
826 ‘Rejection by Col. Nasser’, The Times, 31 October 1956, 8.
827 Sir Charles Dalrymple Belgrave’s Personal Diaries, 1 November 1956.

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