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should consist of six Sunnis and six Shi’ites. 100   This was not well received by some

                   Sunnis on the grounds that the Baharna were never previously awarded with ‘much


                   representation’, and this impasse resulted in the Government’s indefinite


                   postponement of elections to the Committee.   101

                          On the regional scene, Britain was in the process of negotiating its troops’


                   evacuation from the Suez Canal Zone.  The idea of the withdrawal appealed to Eden

                   who aimed to convince Prime Minister Winston Churchill that by withdrawing


                   British forces from Egypt it would attract the Egyptians to enter into an anti-

                   Communist Middle Eastern defence alliance, which was known in its infant stage as


                   the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), propagated significantly following

                   the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.  102   However the British COS believed that


                   ‘it was unlikely that General Neguib would be prepared to commit Egypt to

                   participation in MEDO until he had reached a firm agreement with us about


                   evacuation’. 103   Egyptians resisted entry into any alliances before and during

                   Naguib’s presidency. 104   As a result it was in Britain’s interest to evacuate from the



                   100  ‘W.R. Hay, Summary of Events in the Persian Gulf during the month of September 1952’, in Political Diaries of
                   the Persian Gulf, vol. 19 1951-1954, ed. R.L. Jarman (London: 1990), 1-7 (3-4).
                   101  ‘W.R. Hay, Summary of Events in the Persian Gulf during the month of October 1952’, in Political Diaries of the
                   Persian Gulf, vol. 19 1951-1954, ed. R.L. Jarman (London: 1990), 1-6 (3).
                   102  BDEEP, Series B, Part III, vol. 4, ‘Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East’ 1953-1956.  Doc. 454: PREM
                   11/484, 1 December 1953.  ‘The Canal Zone’: minute by Mr Eden to Mr Churchill on the advantages of an
                   agreement with Egypt without making further concessions, 1 December 1953; E. Monroe, Elizabeth, Britain’s
                   Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956 (London: 1963), 174; R. Takehy, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine:
                   The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1951-57 (New York: 2000), 6, hereafter Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine;
                   and Devereux, Formulation of British Defence Policy, 46.
                   103  BDEEP, Series B, Part II, vol. 4, ‘Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East’ 1949-1953.  Doc. 335: DEFE 4/57,
                   COS 153(52) 2, ‘Middle East defence organisation’: COS Committee minutes on American suggestions for joint
                   proposals on a base settlement, 7 November 1952; TNA, CAB 129/59, C (53)65, Egypt: The Alternatives,
                   Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1953; and TNA, CAB 129/58, C. (53) 17
                   Revise, Egypt: Defence Negotiations, 14 January 1953.
                   104  Prior to the Egyptian coup d’état pamphlets distributed by the Free Officers rejected the idea of participating
                   in Western-oriented pacts as Khalid Mohieddin, an early prominent member of the military movement, recalled
                   in his memoir of pamphlets that stated: ‘Down with colonialism.  Down with alliances with the colonialists.
                   Down with defence alliances.  Down with military Pacts’.  See K. Mohieddin, Wa Al-A’an Atak’lam [Now I Speak]
                   (Cairo: 1992), 91-92, hereafter Now I Speak.



                   © Hamad E. Abdulla                        34
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