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into the village of Arad but Sheikh Abdulla bin Isa Al-Khalifa, the Ruler’s uncle,

convinced them not to do so. He also wisely placed his cars with armed personnel of

his own, to block any penetration by angry Sunni mobs into Arad. Finally a curfew

was imposed on the night of 21 September from 8.30 pm to 5.00 am. A ban on the

assembly of six or more people was also imposed. On 23 September, the curfew was

lifted and the ban on local assembly was also lifted six days later. The incident and
what had followed highlighted the need to improve the training of local police in

dealing with large riots, as Wall identified. He also believed that there was ‘a real

need for more British officers’, in Bahrain’s Police Force. 141 In a discussion recorded

by Burrows with Belgrave, the need to better equip and develop Bahrain’s police

was mutually agreed on. 142

By the end of September the Bahraini Administration was unfortunately slow

in reacting to the sectarian crisis. A state address should have been issued

immediately after the outbreak of the riot. The end of the eventful month of

September, although no deaths were recorded, only saw the arrest of two to three in

relation to the disturbance. In Wall’s view the Administration’s strategy was to ease

tensions within the community and let emotions settle down. In an effort by the

British to explain the unforeseen events, the Political Agent presented the Resident

with a number of possible theories. One was the spread of agitation by Shi’ites

coming from Persia, Iraq, and Al-Hassa in Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. The other

possibility was tied to the greater picture of regional developments as he said:

141 TNA, FO 371/104263, Burrows to FO, 22 September 1953; and TNA, FO 371/104263, Wall to
Burrows, 6 October 1953.
142 TNA, FO 371/104263, Burrows to Belgrave, 13 October 1953.

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