Page 139 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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265. Mr. Gaskin roportcd on 17th November 1002 that he lmd received
authentic information to tho offect that
No. 231 bf Secret E , February 1903, Nos 102*307.
on tho 1st November Abdul Aziz-bin-
Abdul lialnnnn attacked tho Amir of Nejd near a place called Mohamedi iu
Southorn Nejd and defeated him with great slaughter and took his camp with
its equipment on the‘1th Novembor. "Whon tho messengers left Abdul Aziz with
nows of his victory, ho was at Birashi, pursuing the Amir.
2G6. It appears that Abdul Aziz had loft Riadh on tho way to Kharj, and tho
Amir hearing of his departure sent bis cavalry to attack Itiadh whoso horsemen
went out and repulsed tho attack. Tho Amir wont in pursuit of Abdul Aziz,
taking tho village of Silmia, and when he onenmped at Hillam, its inhabitants
and those of the surrounding villages attackodhim and caused him to move his
camp and then went over to join Abdul Aziz at Hanta. Abdul Aziz on hearing
of tho approach of tho Amir went out with tho fighting men to Hanta and.
Harik and the whole of the Dawasir tribesmen to tho place called .Mohamedi
where he encamped for threo days to rest his men and give time to his other
adherents to como up, and finally tho two belligerents met near Mohamedi and
fought a battle in which tho Amir was defeated with heavy slaughter and re­
treated northwards abandoning his camp to tho victors. One of the Amir’s
standards taken by Abdul Aziz bad been sent to Sheikh Mubarak of Kowcit.

XXXI—(1)'Fear of renewal of hostilities between Ibn Rasliid and
Sheikh Mubarak—(8) The Sheikh warned not to involve himself I
in difficulties with Nejd or tho Turks.—(3) Application of the
Sheikh for guns.
August—October 1902.

2G7. In August 1902, tberowas a fear that tbo tido of victory was turning
in favour of Ibn Rashid and that lie
No. 1C9 of Secret E., February 1903, Nos. 1G2-307.
would capture Itiadh. If these fears
wero realized (they wore not, as wc found) it was thought likely that Sheikh
Mubarak would send assistance to his friend Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud. Tho Secre­
tary of Stato in the circumstances telegraphed as follows:—
** Wratislaw reports probability of renewed hostilities between Ibn Rashid and Abdul"
Aziz-bin-Saud. Please instruct Kemball to warn Mubarak against encouraging any
action likely to involve him iu difficulties with Nejd or with Turkish Government."
268. Meanwhile Sheikh Mubarak was evidently alarmed on learning of tho
successes of Ibn Rashid, and in August
No. 125 of Secret E, February 1903, Noi. 162-307.
1902 applied for two or three guns—
ono of which should bo quick-firing. Those guns he wished to place in tho fort
at Jehara to defend his town against attacks from tho Ibn Rashid or
Sheikh Yusuf-el-Ibrahim, who threatened to mako an attack on that side. Tho
fear was that the Sheikh might use the guns for offeusivo operations. He had
heard that Ibn Rashid had received one gun from five guns and that ho had
asked why he should not have guns likewise from tho
British Government, and why he should not uso them iu tho same manner as
Ihn Rashid.
2G9. Government were, however, averse to the Sheikh meddling in internal
Arabian affairs and were afraid he would
No. 181 of do.
use the guns in offensive operations.
There wore' moreover other considerations to be taken into account.
270. His Excellency the Viceroy therefore wired to the Secretary of Stato
on 3rd October 1902—
u Kemball has bcon instructed to warn Mubarak ns in your telegram, 22nd September
IVjth letter, dated 0th September, Kemball forwards request from Mubarak for gift of two or
three guus which, it is understood, arc wanted for Jehara Fort to protect Koweit against laud
nltaok {vide letter from Captain Field to Admiral of 2Hth September 1901, sent with
Secretary's letter, 21st November). Mubarak mentions that Ibn Rashid has with him a
gun presented to him by Turks, and report received through Hahrain says Ton Kushid
has 5 guns. 1 presume answer should be that Mubarak’s request canuot bo mot, but