Page 213 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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The Bombay Government observed
u It is probable Turkish Governor may count on our known policy preventing all naval
operations by littoral powers in Gulf, but Turkey no party to truco. To prevent Wahabi
fiom acting by sea against Turk or Koweit if allied with Turkey is practically an active
intorferouce iu favour of Turkey. Neither Wahabi nor Koweit parties to truce/'
68. On the 9th May the following enquiry from Colonel Polly was received
through the Bombay Government:—
Ibid, (No. 026.)
"Can Turks and Koweit make trucial Chiefs harbour a basis of operations against
Wahabis in friendly relation with Chief ? * * * I presume British subjects
employed on Turkish vessels could not bn concerned in molestation of trucial Chief."
Colonel Felly’s object in asking this last question is explained in bis letter
No. 506—130, dated 20th May. IEe was under tho impression that the debarka­
tion could only be effectod by force and by aid of the fleet’s artillery. A
debarkation of tins character would, in his opinion, constitute a maritime
operation, and would—
“ afford ground for misrepresentation-and even misunderstanding of our known policy of
preventing all naval operations by the littoral powers of the Persian Gulf."
British policy in the Persian Gulf: That policy how affected by
Nejd Expedition.

59. A general view of the British policy of the Gulf, bow that policy was
_______ likely to be affected by the Turkish
.,ragcs expedition, was discussed at this time in
the Foreign Department. The following is extracted from the Foreigo Secre­
tary Mr. Aitchison's note, dated 3rd May 1871:—
'* It should never bo forgotten that, in all its main features, our position in the Persian
Gulf is ono which wo have taken up on grounds of policy. Its foundation iu Treaty is of the
most meagre and narrow kind. In reality it is a position winch wo have arbitrarily assumed as
an act of Slate or conquest, tho justification of it lying, frit, in the circumstances of the time
at which we entered on .it; and, secondly, tho length of time during which we have asserted
tho position we have assumed. His Excellency in Council may, perhaps, rot be aware how
exceedingly narrow is the scope of the Treaty engagements with the Arab tribes for the
maintenance of the peace at sea. The Chief of Bahrein is bound by his special agreement to
abstain from all maritime aggressions of every description so long as he is protected by the
British Government from similar aggressions by the Chiefs and tribes of the Gulf. But the
Chiefs who havo subscribed tho perpetual peace have bound themselves only to abstain
from aggressions on the subjects of tho subscribing parties, and our right or duty to interfere
in virtue of the Treaty is limited to eases in which one of the parties ti the maritime peace
commits on outrage on another. In all ether cases our interference with warlike operations,
whether by parties to the Treaty of peace, or by Chiefs who arc nut parties to that Treaty, is
based on no letter foundation than our own determina tion to do so, and the fact that we
have done so for a long series of years. If we have no Treaty right, and are under no
Treaty obligation to prevent such an expedition as the present on the part of Turkey or
Persia, neither havo we any such right, or are wo under any such obligation, to prevent any
of tho subscribers to the maritime peace from attacking the Turks or the Persians by sea,
or fitting out a similar expedition against any party who has not signed the Treaty. It may
be said that the Turkish expedition is so far peculiar, that it is proceeding against Turkish
subjects to re-ostaMish authority in their own counfciy. The recent telegrams make this by
no means certain, but even if it be the case, it haidly affects the question. . We cannot make
our policy at sea dcp«-nd on Arab politics ashore ; we ennoot attempt to make our interference
to prevent an expedition by 6ea depend on the justice or injustice of tho claims which the
expedition is intended to assert. To do so would involvo us in the intricate domestic relations
of tho Arab tribes, which wo neither know nor are capablo of understanding. Hitherto our
policy has been to prevent all expcdiriou6 by sea. and to impose the restriction on all alike, both
great and small. The possibility of our maintaining our position seems to me to depend on onr
maintaining it in its integrity If wo admit exceptions, I do not see where we oan stop io our
rotroat till we reach tho narrow ground covered by our Treaties. We shall never make the
oxoeptions intelligible to thoso who arc not admitted to the benefit of them- If the Turks send
their troops by s«aj the Wahabis and tho Arab Chiefs who support Saud have cleariy a right
to attack them by sea. If the Arabs are defeated, wo cannot provent the Turks from exorcis­
ing over thorn all tho rights of succcs^ul war, and establishing thoir supremacy over the Arub
country. Thoro is then an end to our policy in the Gulf; or if tho Arab Chiefs, remaining
quiet now, wish hereafter to lit out 6omo naval force, how aro we to prevont them when we